Abstract
This paper extends the N-person IPD game into a more interesting game in economics, namely, the oligopoly game. Due to its market share dynamics, the oligopoly game is more complicated and is in general not an exact N-person IPD game. Using genetic algroithms, we simulated the oligopoly games under various settings. It is found that, even in the case of a three-oligopolist (three-player) game, collusive pricing (cooperation) is not the dominating result.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Chen, SH., Ni, CC. (1999). Using Genetic Algorithms to Simulate the Evolution of an Oligopoly Game. In: McKay, B., Yao, X., Newton, C.S., Kim, JH., Furuhashi, T. (eds) Simulated Evolution and Learning. SEAL 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 1585. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_38
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48873-1_38
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