Abstract
No off-line electronic coin scheme has yet been proposed which is both provably secure with respect to natural cryptographic assumptions and efficient with respect to reasonable measures. We show that off-line coin schemes can be implemented securely and efficiently, where security is proven based on the hardness of the discrete log function and a pre-processing stage, and where efficiency is in a new sense that we put forth in this work: “a protocol is efficient if its communication complexity is independent of the computational complexity of its participants” (and thus the communication length and number of encryption operations is only a low-degree polynomial of the input).
Partially supported by an AT&T Bell Laboratories Scholarship. Work supported in part by NSF Grant CCR-9014605 and NSF CISE Institutional Infrastructure Grant CDA-90-24735
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Franklin, M., Yung, M. (1993). Secure and efficient off-line digital money (extended abstract). In: Lingas, A., Karlsson, R., Carlsson, S. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 700. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-56939-1_78
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-56939-1_78
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