Skip to main content

A sphere world semantics for default reasoning

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 928))

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that we can consider an extension of a Reiter's default theory (W,Δ) as the expansion of the (belief) set W by some maximal set D of consequences of defaults in Δ. We will use the model of revision functions proposed by Grove [13] to characterize the models of the extensions in Reiter's default logic [24], showing that the class of models we obtain in the special case when a revision is an expansion (i.e., a new sentence A is added to a belief set K and no sentence in K is deleted), is the class of models of some extension in Reiter's default logic. Furthermore, we will show that the class of models in Poole's system for default reasoning can be characterized in the same way.

The author is sponsered by CAPES fellowship.

The author is partially sponsored by the Brazilian National Research Agency (CNPq).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. C.E. Alchourrón, P. Gärdenfors, D. Makinson: On the logic of theory change: partial meet functions for contraction and revision. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510–530(1985).

    Google Scholar 

  2. C.E. Alchourrón, D. Makinson: On the logic of theory change: contraction functions and their associated revision functions. Theoria 48, 14–37 (1982).

    Google Scholar 

  3. P. Besnard: An introduction to default logic. Berlin: Springer-Verlag 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  4. N. Bidoit and C. Froidevaux. General logical databases and programs: default logic semantics and stratification. Information and Computation 91, 15–54 (1991).

    Google Scholar 

  5. N. Bidoit and C. Froidevaux. Negation by default and unstratifiable logic programs. Theoretical Computer Science 78, 85–112 (1991).

    Google Scholar 

  6. C. Boutilier: Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework. Artificial Intelligence 68, 33–85 (1994).

    Google Scholar 

  7. C. Boutilier:.: Conditional logics of normality: a modal approach. Artificial Intelligence 68, 87–154 (1994).

    Google Scholar 

  8. G. Brewka: Nonmonotonic reasoning: logical foundations of commonsense. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  9. D. W. Etherington.: Reasoning with imcomplete information. Research Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Pitman, London 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  10. D. W. Etherington: Formalizing non-monotonic reasoning systems. Artificial Intelligence 31, 41–85 (1987).

    Google Scholar 

  11. P. Gärdenfors: Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations. Artificial Intelligence 65, 197–245 (1994).

    Google Scholar 

  12. P. Gärdenfors: Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states. The MIT Press, Bradford Books, Cambridge, MA, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  13. A. Grove: Two modellings for theory change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17, 157–170 (1988).

    Google Scholar 

  14. R. Guerreiro and M.Casanova. An alternative semantics for default logic. The Third International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, South Lake Tahoe, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  15. D. Lewis: Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1973.

    Google Scholar 

  16. V. Lifschitz. On open default. In J. Lloyd, editor, Cmputational logic. Symposium proceedings, pp. 80–95. ESPRIT Basic Research Series. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  17. W. Lukaszewicz: Non-monotonic reasoning: Formalization of commonsense reasoning. Ellis Horwood Series in Artificial Intelligence (Ellis Horwood, Chichester,England) 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  18. W. Lukaszewicz: Two results on default logic. In: Proceedings IJCAI-85, Los Angeles, CA, 459–461 (1985).

    Google Scholar 

  19. D. Makinson: General theory of cumulative inference. In: M. Reinfrank, J. de Kleer, M.L. Ginsberg and Sandewall, eds., Non-monotonic Reasoning, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 346. Berlin: Springer 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  20. D. Makinson, P. Gärdenfors: Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic. In A. Fuhrmannand M. Morreau, eds., The Logic of Theory Change, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 465. Berlin: Springer 1991, pp. 185–205.

    Google Scholar 

  21. W. Marek and M. Truszczynski: Nonmonotonic logic — context-dependent reasoning. Berlin: Springer-Verlag 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  22. W. Marek and M. Truszczynski: Stable semantics for logic programs and default theories. In E. Lusk and R. Overbeek, editors, Proceedings of the North American Conference on Logic Programming, pp. 243–256, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  23. D. Poole: A logical framework for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 36, 27–47 (1988).

    Google Scholar 

  24. R. Reiter: A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 13, 81–132 (1980).

    Google Scholar 

  25. M. Ryan: Ordered presentations of theories — default reasoning and belief revision. Ph. D. Thesis, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Schaub, T.H., Considerations on default logic, Ph.D. Thesis, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

V. Wiktor Marek Anil Nerode M. Truszczyński

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

da Silva, J.C.P., Veloso, S.R.M. (1995). A sphere world semantics for default reasoning. In: Marek, V.W., Nerode, A., Truszczyński, M. (eds) Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. LPNMR 1995. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 928. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-59487-6_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-59487-6_13

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-59487-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49282-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics