Abstract
It turns out that security becomes more and more important in many information systems. In this paper, we are more specifically interested in confidentiality requirement. In this context, we show how knowledge representation technique based on formal logic can be used to propose a faithful model of confidentiality. Our approach is to develop a modal logic framework which combines doxastic and deontic logics. This framework enables to specify confidentiality policies -in particular, multilevel security policies- and express various types of security constraints including consistency, completeness and inference control constraints.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Cuppens, F., Demolombe, R. (1997). A modal logical framework for security policies. In: Raś, Z.W., Skowron, A. (eds) Foundations of Intelligent Systems. ISMIS 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1325. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-63614-5_56
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-63614-5_56
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