Keywords and Synonyms
False-name-proof auctions; Pseudonymous bidding ; Robustness against false-name bids
Problem Definition
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e. g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one item/good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple items/goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a false-name bid.
Here, use the same model as the GVA section. In addition, false-name bids are modeled as follows.
Each bidder can use multiple identifiers.
Each identifier is unique and cannot be impersonated.
Nobody (except the owner) knows whether two identifiers belongs to the same bidder or not.
The goal is to design a false-name-proof protocol, i. e., a protocol in which using false-names is useless, thus bidders voluntarily...
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Iwasaki, A., Yokoo, M., Terada, K.: A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids. Decis. Support. Syst. 39, 23–39 (2005)
Yokoo, M.: The characterization of strategy/false-name proof combinatorial auction protocols: Price-oriented, rationing-free protocol. In: Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 733–739 (2003)
Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. Artif. Intell. 130, 167–181 (2001)
Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in Internet auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 46, 174–188 (2004)
Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. Decis. Support. Syst. 39, 23–39 (2005)
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag
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Yokoo, M. (2008). False-Name-Proof Auction. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_141
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_141
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-30770-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-30162-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceReference Module Computer Science and Engineering