Skip to main content

False-Name-Proof Auction

2004; Yokoo, Sakurai, Matsubara

  • Reference work entry
  • 296 Accesses

Keywords and Synonyms

False-name-proof auctions; Pseudonymous bidding ; Robustness against false-name bids      

Problem Definition

In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e. g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one item/good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple items/goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a false-name bid.

Here, use the same model as the GVA section. In addition, false-name bids are modeled as follows.

  • Each bidder can use multiple identifiers.

  • Each identifier is unique and cannot be impersonated.

  • Nobody (except the owner) knows whether two identifiers belongs to the same bidder or not.

The goal is to design a false-name-proof protocol, i. e., a protocol in which using false-names is useless, thus bidders voluntarily...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   399.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Recommended Reading

  1. Iwasaki, A., Yokoo, M., Terada, K.: A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids. Decis. Support. Syst. 39, 23–39 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Yokoo, M.: The characterization of strategy/false-name proof combinatorial auction protocols: Price-oriented, rationing-free protocol. In: Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 733–739 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. Artif. Intell. 130, 167–181 (2001)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in Internet auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 46, 174–188 (2004)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. Decis. Support. Syst. 39, 23–39 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Springer-Verlag

About this entry

Cite this entry

Yokoo, M. (2008). False-Name-Proof Auction. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_141

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics