Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Mechanism Design

  • Reference work entry
Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

  • 467 Accesses

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 3,499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 549.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Abbreviations

A social choice function:

A function that determines a social choice according to players’ preferences over the different possible alternatives.

A mechanism :

A game in incomplete information, in which player strategies are based on their private preferences. A mechanism implements a social choice function f if the equilibrium strategies yield an outcome that coincides with f.

Dominant strategies:

An equilibrium concept where the strategy of each player maximizes her utility, no matter what strategies the other players choose.

Bayesian–Nash equilibrium :

An equilibrium concept that requires the strategy of each player to maximize the expected utility of the player, where the expectation is taken over the types of the other players.

VCG mechanisms:

A family of mechanisms that implement in dominant strategies the social choice function that maximizes the social welfare.

Bibliography

  1. Archer A, Tardos E (2001) Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In: Proceedings of the 42st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS’01, Las Vegas. IEEE Computer Society

    Google Scholar 

  2. Arrow K (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  3. Arrow K (1979) The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information. In: Boskin M (ed) Economies and Human Welfare. Academic Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  4. Athey S, Segal I (2007) Designing dynamic mechanisms. Am Econ Rev 97(2):131–136

    Google Scholar 

  5. Babaioff M, Lavi R, Pavlov E (2006) Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies. In: Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA, Miami. ACM Press

    Google Scholar 

  6. Bergemann D, Morris S (2005) Robust mechanism design. Econometrica 73:1771–1813

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Bikhchandani S, Chatterjee S, Lavi R, Mu’alem A, Nisan N, Sen A (2006) Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation. Econometrica 74(4):1109–1132

    Google Scholar 

  8. Clarke E (1971) Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 8:17–33

    Google Scholar 

  9. Cremer J, McLean R (1985) Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent. Econometrica 53:345–361

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. d’Aspremont C, Gérard-Varet L (1979) Incentives and incomplete information. J Public Econ 11:25–45

    Google Scholar 

  11. Dekel E, Wolinsky A (2003) Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions. Games Econ Behav 43(2):175–188

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 41(4):587–601

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Groves T (1973) Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41(4):617–631

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Gui H, Muller R, Vohra RV (2004) Characterizing dominant strategy mechanisms with multi-dimensional types. Working paper, unpublished

    Google Scholar 

  15. Jehiel P, Meyer ter Vehn M, Moldovanu B, Zame WR (2006) The limits of ex-post implementation. Econometrica 74(3):585–610

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Lavi R, Nisan N (2004) Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. Theor Comput Sci 310:159–180

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Lavi R, Swamy C (2007) Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling. In: The Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC’07, San Diego. ACM Press

    Google Scholar 

  18. Lavi R, Mu’alem A, Nisan N (2003) Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings of the 44rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS’03, Cambridge. IEEE Computer Society

    Google Scholar 

  19. Monderer D (2007) Monotonicity and implementability. Working paper, unpublished

    Google Scholar 

  20. Moulin H (1999) Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness. Soc Choice Welf 16:279–320

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Myerson R (1981) Optimal auction design. Math Oper Res 6:58–73

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  22. Myerson R, Satterthwaite M (1983) Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J Econ Theor 29:265–281

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  23. Nisan N, Ronen A (2001) Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econ Behav 35:166–196

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  24. Nisan N, Roughgarden T, Tardos E, Vazirani VV (eds) (2007) Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, New York

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  25. Roberts K (1979) The characterization of implementable choise rules. In: Laffont JJ (ed) Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 321–349

    Google Scholar 

  26. Rochet JC (1987) A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context. J Math Econ 16:191–200

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  27. Satterthwaite M (1975) Strategy-proofness and arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theor 10:187–217

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  28. Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculations, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J Financ 16:8–37

    Google Scholar 

  29. Wilson R (1987) Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes. In: Bewley T (ed) Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 33–70

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

    Ron Lavi

Authors
  1. Ron Lavi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag

About this entry

Cite this entry

Lavi, R. (2009). Mechanism Design. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_327

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation