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The Lower Bound of Attacks on Anonymity Systems — A Unicity Distance Approach

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Book cover Quality of Protection

Part of the book series: Advances in Information Security ((ADIS,volume 23))

Abstract

During the last years a couple of attacks on generic anonymity protocols emerged, like e.g. the hitting-set attack. These attacks make use of informations gained by passively monitoring anonymizing networks to disclose the communication profile of the users.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department Informatik IV, Aachen University of Technology, Ahornstr. 55, D-52074, Aachen, Germany

    Dogan Kesdogan & Lexi Pimenidis

Authors
  1. Dogan Kesdogan
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  2. Lexi Pimenidis
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute Security in Distributed Applications, TU Hamburg-Harburg, Harburger Schloßstraße 20, 21079, Hamburg, Germany

    Dieter Gollmann

  2. Dipartimento Informatica e Telecomunicazioni (DIT), University of Trento, Via Sommarive, 14 38050, Trento, Italy

    Fabio Massacci  & Artsiom Yautsiukhin  & 

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© 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

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Kesdogan, D., Pimenidis, L. (2006). The Lower Bound of Attacks on Anonymity Systems — A Unicity Distance Approach. In: Gollmann, D., Massacci, F., Yautsiukhin, A. (eds) Quality of Protection. Advances in Information Security, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36584-8_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36584-8_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-387-29016-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-387-36584-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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