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Cryptographic Engineering pp 381–406Cite as

Improved Techniques for Side-Channel Analysis

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Generalizations to multiple observations and more than two hypotheses are straightforward.

  2. 2.

    We omit the derivation of these estimators as the derivation is tedious and follows from straight-forward algebraic manipulations.

  3. 3.

    The slight offset in time is due to delay of EM signals with respect to the power signal.

  4. 4.

    For simplicity, this chapter deals with independent elementary operation invocations. Techniques also exist for adaptive invocations.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, America

    Pankaj Rohatgi

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  1. Pankaj Rohatgi
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Correspondence to Pankaj Rohatgi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. City University of Istanbul, Tophane, Istanbul, Turkey

    Çetin Kaya Koç

  2. University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

    Çetin Kaya Koç

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Rohatgi, P. (2009). Improved Techniques for Side-Channel Analysis. In: Koç, Ç.K. (eds) Cryptographic Engineering. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71817-0_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-71817-0_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-387-71816-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-387-71817-0

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