This note argues that Read confuses provability and truth in his interpretation of T-sentences as related to the T-scheme. Moreover, his proposal is much more intensional than that of Tarski. This circumstance has a relevance for defining falsity.
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Reference
[1] J. Woleński, In defence of the semantic definition of truth, Synthese 126: 67–90 (2001).
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Woleński, J. (2008). Read about T-Scheme. In: Rahman, S., Tulenheimo, T., Genot, E. (eds) Unity, Truth and the Liar. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8468-3_12
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