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Information Flow and Noninterference

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Synonyms

Information flow security

Related Concepts

Covert Channels; Information Theory; Mandatory Access Control; Multilevel Security Policies; Refinement Paradox; Security Certification; Security Policy; Side-Channel Analysis; Side-Channel Attacks

Definition

Noninterference is a property that restricts the information flow through a system. It can be used to express aspects of confidentiality and integrity.

Background

Goguen and Meseguer introduced noninterference in 1982 as a declarative definition of the property “no illegitimate information flow can occur” for deterministic state machines. Subsequently, numerous security properties were proposed in order to relax the restrictive original definition or to adapt the intuition underlying noninterference to other models of computation.

Theory

A process A is said to be noninterfering with another process B across a system M if A’s input to M has no effect on M’s output to B. This property implies that no information flows from A to B...

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Recommended Reading

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Mantel, H. (2011). Information Flow and Noninterference. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_874

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