

Adaptive Cryptographic Access Control

Advances in Information Security

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Adaptive Cryptographic Access Control

Foreword by Sylvia L. Osborn

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*To our beloved ones for being so supportive
and patient, even the during trying moments.*

Foreword

For a designer of the security for an information system, a large number of concepts must be mastered, not to mention the interactions of these concepts with each other. Should I use cryptography? How do I generate keys? How do I change keys if I think my system has been breached? Do I have to re-encrypt all my data every time I generate a new key for one class of data? Do I have to be constantly monitoring the system and intervening to update keys?

This monograph provides answers to all of these questions. It begins by presenting thorough background on access control models in general and, in more detail, on cryptographic access control. The assumption is made that keys will be assigned to groups, so that when the security policy gives a group access to some data, the key can be used for decryption of the data that is to be visible to the group. An algorithm, which improves on previous techniques, for minimizing the cost of key assignment and replacement is presented, and analysed both theoretically and with experiments. A further improvement to the time taken for re-keying is also presented.

If the security policy changes frequently, group memberships may change, requiring both new keys and re-encrypting the data accessible to the group. The techniques mentioned above reduce the time for rekeying and re-encryption over existing techniques. To cope with a high frequency of changes, an autonomic computing model is used to create an adaptive rekeying approach to key management, thus freeing the security administrator from some of their monitoring load. Finally, the implications of managing encrypted data when it is stored on a third-party site are also discussed.

The monograph, while scholarly, is written in manner that makes it readable by both practitioners and researchers. It combines a solid theoretical approach with experimental evaluation, so that the user of these new algorithms and techniques can be assured not only that they will work, but also that they will be more efficient than previous approaches.

London, Ontario, Canada; March, 2010

Sylvia L. Osborn

Preface

Our motivations for writing this monograph are centered on the fact that although a significant amount of research exists on the topics of cryptographic key management and access control, most texts tend to focus on access control models and only cover cryptographic key management superficially. This monograph is meant to help students, researchers, and teachers with an interest in access control and cryptographic key management. For the student, our purpose is to present material in a readable manner, and highlight the current trends in cryptographic key management. Our goal was to show students, who are often skeptical about the practicality of cryptographically supported access control, how access control and cryptographic key management can be combined to ensure data security.

For the researcher, our goal is to analyze the different solutions that have been presented in the literature highlighting their pros and cons with respect to the growing need for adaptive security. We go on to present a method of implementing adaptive access control and discuss the challenges involved in designing adaptive access control schemes. It is our hope that we have achieved our goal of kindling interest in this area by evoking some of the interesting problems worth working on.

For the instructor, this text will serve as support material for the topics of cryptographic key management and access control. We hope that it will give instructors a broader and in depth perspective of both topics allowing them to teach more effectively and efficiently in ways that are most appropriate for their particular set of students.

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rors in the monograph and we alone must take responsibility for those. We are also deeply indebted to the Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship Fund for financially supporting the research on which this text is grounded.

Bremen, Germany;
Kingston, ON, Canada; March, 2010

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