Skip to main content

Formal Verification of Safety Requirements on Complex Systems

  • Conference paper
Safe Comp 96

Abstract

In this paper we present a logical characterization, by means of ACTL formulae, of safety requirements to be formally verified over safety critical complex systems. In this class of systems the formal verification of requirements is often hardened by state explosion problems. To deal with this problem, the characterization we propose allows the satisfiability of a safety requirement over a complex system to be derived by its satisfiability over those component subsystems that are directly involved in the given requirement. The proposed methodology has been successfully used for the formal verification of safety requirements of a particular system, that is a railway computer based signalling control system.

Work partially supported by OLOS HCM Network-EC Contract No. CHRX-CT94-0577

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bowen, J.P., Hinchey, M.G, Seven More Myths of Formal Methods, IEEE Software, 12, July 1995, pp. 34–41.

    Google Scholar 

  2. E. M. Clarke, E. A. Emerson, A. P. Sistla. Automatic Verification of Finite-State Concurrent Systems Using Temporal Logic Specification. ACM Transaction on Programming Languages and Systems, 8(2), April 1980, pp. 244–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. J. R. Burch, E.M. Clarke, K. L. McMillan, D. L. Dill, L. J. Hwang. Symbolic model checking: 1020 states and beyond. Information and Computation 98(2), June 1992, pp. 142–270.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. R. Milner. Communication and Concurrency. Prentice Hall, 1989.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. A. Anselmi, C. Bernardeschi, A. Fantechi, S. Gnesi, S. Larosa, G. Mongardi, F. Torielli. An experience in formal verification of safety properties of a railway signalling control system. Proceedings of the SAFECOMP’95 Conference, Belgirate, Springer - Verlag, 1995, pp. 474–488.

    Google Scholar 

  6. A. Bouali, S. Gnesi, S. Larosa. The integration Project for the JACK Environment. Bulletin of the EATCS, n.54, October 1994, pp.207–223.

    Google Scholar 

  7. C. Da Silva, B. Dehbonei, F. Mejia. Formal Specification in the Development of Industrial Applications: Subway Speed Control System. Formal Description Techniques, V (C-10) M. Diaz and R. Groz (Editors) Elsevier Science Publishers B, V, (North-Holland), 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Hoare, C.A.R., Communicating Sequential Processes, Prentice Hall Int., London, 1985.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Boudol, G Notes on Algebraic Calculi of Processes. Notes on Algebraic Calculi of Processes, NATO ASI Series F13, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  10. De Nicola, R., Vaandrager, F W., Action versus State based Logics for Transition Systems, in Proceedings Ecole de Printemps on Semantics of Concurrency Lecture Notes in Computer Science 469, Springer-Verlag, 1990, pp. 407–419.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Emerson, E. A., Halpern, J. Y., “Sometimes” and “Not Never” Revisited: on Branching Time versus Linear Time Temporal Logic, Journal of ACM, 33, 1980, 151–178.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. G. Mongardi. Dependable Computing for Railway Control Systems, in Dependable Computing for Critical Applications 3, Dependable Computing and Fault-Tolerant Systems 8, Springer-Verlag, 1992, pp. 255–277.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1997 Springer-Verlag London Limited

About this paper

Cite this paper

Bernardeschi, C., Fantechi, A., Gnesi, S. (1997). Formal Verification of Safety Requirements on Complex Systems. In: Schoitsch, E. (eds) Safe Comp 96. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0937-2_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0937-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-76070-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-0937-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics