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Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibrium

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Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

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Abstract

This chapter introduces strategic form games, which provide a framework for the analysis of strategic interactions in multi-agent environments. We present the main solution concept in strategic form games, Nash equilibrium, and provide tools for its systematic study. We present fundamental results for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and discuss their efficiency properties. We conclude with current research directions in this area.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Asuman Ozdaglar

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  1. Asuman Ozdaglar
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Correspondence to Asuman Ozdaglar .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

    John Baillieul

  2. Automation and Control Solutions, Honeywell, Golden Valley, Minnesota, USA

    Tariq Samad

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© 2013 Springer-Verlag London

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Ozdaglar, A. (2013). Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibrium. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_27-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_27-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9

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