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Mechanism Design

Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

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Abstract

Mechanism design is concerned with the design of strategic environments to achieve desired outcomes at equilibria of the resulting game. We briefly overview central ideas in mechanism design. We survey both objectives the mechanism designer may seek to achieve, as well as equilibrium concepts the designer may use to model agents. We conclude by discussing a seminal example of mechanism design at work: the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

    Ramesh Johari

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  1. Ramesh Johari
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Correspondence to Ramesh Johari .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

    John Baillieul

  2. Automation and Control Solutions, Honeywell, Golden Valley, Minnesota, USA

    Tariq Samad

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© 2013 Springer-Verlag London

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Johari, R. (2013). Mechanism Design. In: Baillieul, J., Samad, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Systems and Control. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_38-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_38-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-5102-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference EngineeringReference Module Computer Science and Engineering

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Mechanism Design
    Published:
    10 September 2019

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_38-2

  2. Original

    Mechanism Design
    Published:
    28 February 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_38-1

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