Abstract
In our paper, we investigate a statistical property of random functions we named drainage. (Definitions for drainage, random function, etc. will be given shortly.) Our motivation for doing so is twofold. First, it generally assumed that a good cryptographic system will exhibit no simple statistical regularity. For example, the function from key to ciphertext when a block cipher is used to encode a fixed plaintext should appear to be completely random. We were therefore interested in studying the behavior of drainage for a random function, and then comparing it to the measured behavior for a real cryptosystem, the DES. Secondly, drainage is closely related to statistical properties which are important to the performance of the generalized cryptanalytic attack proposed by Hellman [1], discussed below.
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References
M. E. Hellman, “A cryptanalytic time-memory tradeoff,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT-28, pp. 401–408, July 1980.
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© 1983 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Hellman, M.E., Reyneri, J.M. (1983). Drainage and the DES Summary. In: Chaum, D., Rivest, R.L., Sherman, A.T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4_11
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