Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work
1995; Varian
Problem Definition
Auctions are used for allocating goods, tasks, resources, etc. Participants in an auction include an auctioneer (usually a seller) and bidders (usually buyers). An auction has well-defined rules that enforce an agreement between the auctioneer and the winning bidder. Auctions are often used when a seller has difficulty in estimating the value of an auctioned good for buyers.
The Generalized Vickrey Auction protocol (GVA) [5] is an auction protocol that can be used for combinatorial auctions [3] in which multiple items/goods are sold simultaneously. Although conventional auctions sell a single item at a time, combinatorial auctions sell multiple items/goods. These goods may have interdependent values, e.g., these goods are complementary/substitutable and bidders can bid on any combination of goods. In a combinatorial auction, a bidder can express complementary/substitutable preferences over multiple bids. By...
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Ausubel LM, Milgrom PR (2002) Ascending auctions with package bidding. Front Theor Econ 1(1). Article 1
Clarke EH (1971) Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 2:19–33
Cramton P, Steinberg R, Shoham Y (eds) (2005) Combinatorial auctions. MIT, Cambridge
Mas-Colell A, Whinston MD, Green JR (1995) Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Varian HR (1995) Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In: Proceedings of the 1st Usenix workshop on electronic commerce
Vickrey W (1961) Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J Financ 16:8–37
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© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Yokoo, M. (2016). Generalized Vickrey Auction. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_163
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