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Multiple Unit Auctions with Budget Constraint

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Encyclopedia of Algorithms

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Recommended Reading

  1. Abrams Z (2006) Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets. In: Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms (SODA-06), Miami, pp 1074–1082

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  2. Bhattacharya S, Conitzer V, Munagala K, Xia L (2010) Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions. In: Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms (SODA-10), Austin, pp 554–572

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  3. Borgs C, Chayes JT, Immorlica N, Mahdian M, Saberi A (2005) Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. In: ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC-05), Vancouver, pp 44–51

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  4. Bu TM, Qi Q, Sun AW (2008) Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints. Theor Comput Sci 393(1–3):1–13

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  5. Dobzinski S, Lavi R, Nisan N (2012) Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games Econ Behav 74(2):486–503

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  6. Fiat A, Goldberg AV, Hartline JD, Karlin AR (2002) Competitive generalized auctions. In: Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM symposium on theory of computing (STOC-02), New York, pp 72–81

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  7. Nisan N, Ronen A (1999) Algorithmic mechanism design. In: Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on theory of computing (STOC-99), New York, pp 129–140

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  8. Parkes DC (2004) Chapter 2: iterative combinatorial auctions. PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Software Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China

    Tian-Ming Bu

Authors
  1. Tian-Ming Bu
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Correspondence to Tian-Ming Bu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

    Ming-Yang Kao

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Bu, TM. (2016). Multiple Unit Auctions with Budget Constraint. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_251

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