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Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents

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  • First Online:
Encyclopedia of Algorithms

  • 56 Accesses

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

  • 2005; Briest, Krysta, Vöcking

Problem Definition

This problem deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive compatible, or truthful, mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with selfish one-parameter agents and a single seller. The focus is on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness.

A one parameter agent is an agent who as her private data has some resource as well as a valuation, i.e., the maximum amount of money she is willing to pay for this resource. Sometimes, however, the resource is assumed to be known to the mechanism. The scenario where a single seller offers these resources to the agents is primarily considered. Typically, the seller aims at maximizing the social welfare or her revenue. The work by Briest, Krysta and Vöcking [6] will mostly be considered, but also other existing models and...

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the case of unknown single-minded bidders, the bidders have as private data not only their valuations (as in the case of known single-minded bidders) but also the sets they demand.

Recommended Reading

  1. Andelman N, Mansour Y (2006) A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents. In: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC), Ann Arbor, June 2006

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  6. Briest P, Krysta P, Vöcking B (2005) Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. In: Proceedings of the 37th annual ACM symposium on theory of computing (STOC), pp 39–48

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

    Piotr Krysta

  2. Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Berthold Vöcking

Authors
  1. Piotr Krysta
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  2. Berthold Vöcking
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Piotr Krysta .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

    Ming-Yang Kao

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Krysta, P., Vöcking, B. (2016). Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_454

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