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Formalism in Safety Cases

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Abstract

Suitable formalisms could allow the arguments of a safety case to be checked mechanically. We examine some of the issues in doing so.

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References

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Acknowledgments

My research was supported by NASA cooperative agreements NNX08AC64A and NNX08AY53A, and by National Science Foundation grant CNS-0720908. I am grateful to Robin Bloomfield and his colleagues at Adelard and City University for exposing me to some of these topics and sharing their own ongoing investigations. However, the views expressed here are mine alone and do not represent those of my sponsors or collaborators.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International Menlo Park, California, USA

    John Rushby

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  1. John Rushby
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dale Research Ltd., North Street 33, Martock, TA12 6DH, United Kingdom

    Chris Dale

  2. Dept. Software Retiability, University Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, United Kingdom

    Tom Anderson

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© 2010 Springer-Verlag London

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Rushby, J. (2010). Formalism in Safety Cases. In: Dale, C., Anderson, T. (eds) Making Systems Safer. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84996-086-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84996-086-1_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-84996-085-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-84996-086-1

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