Abstract
At present, the security of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) codes mainly depends on the detection of code defects. However, there is no detection of malicious behaviors that violates the safety requirements. In this paper, we propose an approach to detect the malicious behaviors of PLC programs based on state verification. In particular, avoid state space explosion by merging the same output state of the same scan cycle and removing the output states that have been analyzed in previous scan cycles. For timer, we deduce all output states of a timer based on the analysis of part output state transition relationships. Moreover, the sequence of input vector that violates the safety requirement could be obtained when malicious behaviors are found. Based on experimental results, our method takes less than 5 min for the worst case, it can be proved that our method can detect PLC malicious behaviors effectively and accurately.
This work is partially supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (2016YFB0800203).
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Chang, T., Wei, Q., Liu, W., Geng, Y. (2018). Detecting PLC Program Malicious Behaviors Based on State Verification. In: Sun, X., Pan, Z., Bertino, E. (eds) Cloud Computing and Security. ICCCS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11067. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00018-9_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00018-9_22
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