Abstract
This paper gives a modular verification methodology in which, given parametric specifications of a key establishment protocol P and a protocol Q providing private channel communication, security and authenticity properties of their sequential composition \(P\; ;\; Q\) can be reduced to: (i) verification of corresponding properties for P, and (ii) verification of corresponding properties for an abstract version \(Q^\alpha \) of Q in which keys have been suitably abstracted. Our results improve upon previous work in this area in several ways. First of all, we both support a large class of equational theories and provide tool support via the Maude-NPA cryptographic protocol analysis tool. Secondly as long as certain conditions on P and Q guaranteeing the secrecy of keys inherited by Q from P are satisfied, our results apply to the composition of any two reachability properties of the two protocols.
Partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MINECO under grant TIN 2015-69175-C4-1-R, by the Generalitat Valenciana under grant PROMETEOII/2015/013, by the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-17-1-0286, and by NRL under contract number N00173-17-1-G002.
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Available at http://personales.upv.es/sanesro/Maude-NPA-channel/.
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Yang, F., Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J. (2018). Modular Verification of Sequential Composition for Private Channels in Maude-NPA. In: Katsikas, S., Alcaraz, C. (eds) Security and Trust Management. STM 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11091. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01141-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01141-3_2
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