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International Conference on Provable Security

ProvSec 2018: Provable Security pp 387–396Cite as

User-Mediated Authentication Protocols and Unforgeability in Key Collision

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11192))

Abstract

This research provides a computational analysis of the ISO 9798-6 standard’s Mechanism 7a authentication protocol. In contrast to typical authentication protocols, ISO 9798-6 mechanism 7a requires user interaction and aims to authenticate data possession instead of identities. Consequently, we introduce a 3-party possession user mediated authentication (3-PUMA) model. Furthermore, we demonstrate the necessary security guarantees of the MAC primitive – which include non-standard assumptions – and introduce existential unforgeability under key collision attacks (EUF-KCA). The resulting analysis demonstrates a notable lack in the standard’s requirements and has implications for other PUMA protocols.

This research was partially supported by and performed at SINTEF Digital, Trondheim, Norway.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA, USA

    Britta Hale

Authors
  1. Britta Hale
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Correspondence to Britta Hale .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Joonsang Baek

  2. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Willy Susilo

  3. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Jongkil Kim

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Hale, B. (2018). User-Mediated Authentication Protocols and Unforgeability in Key Collision. In: Baek, J., Susilo, W., Kim, J. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11192. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01446-9_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01446-9_22

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01445-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01446-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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