Abstract
Current signature and encryption schemes secure against continual leakage fail completely if the key in any time period is fully exposed. We suggest forward security as a second line of defense, so that in the event of full exposure of the current secret key, at least uses of keys prior to this remain secure, a big benefit in practice. (For example if the signer is a certificate authority, full exposure of the current secret key would not invalidate certificates signed under prior keys.) We provide definitions for signatures and encryption that are forward-secure under continual leakage. Achieving these definitions turns out to be challenging, and we make initial progress with some constructions and transforms.
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Acknowledgments
Bellare and Stepanovs were supported in part by NSF grants CNS-1526801 and CNS-1717640, ERC Project ERCC FP7/615074 and a gift from Microsoft.
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Bellare, M., O’Neill, A., Stepanovs, I. (2018). Forward-Security Under Continual Leakage. In: Capkun, S., Chow, S. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11261. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02641-7_1
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