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Raven Authentication Service

Attacks and Countermeasures

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Security Protocols XXVI (Security Protocols 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11286))

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Abstract

Raven is the name of the University of Cambridge’s central web authentication service. Many online resources within the University require Raven authentication to protect private data. Individual users are uniquely identified by their Common Registration Scheme identifier (CRSid), and protected online resources refer users to the Raven service for verification of a password. We perform a formal analysis of the proprietary Ucam Webauth protocol and identify a number of practical attacks against the Raven service that uses it. Having considered each vulnerability, we discuss the general principles and lessons that can be learnt to help avoid such vulnerabilities in the future.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://apereo.github.io/cas/5.0.x/protocol/CAS-Protocol-Specification.html.

  2. 2.

    http://webauth.stanford.edu/protocol.html.

  3. 3.

    https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt.

  4. 4.

    https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis_o.html.

  5. 5.

    https://cabforum.org/2014/10/16/ballot-118-sha-1-sunset/.

  6. 6.

    It should be noted that inference rule H has been considered unjustified by Teepe, who questions the soundness of BAN logic in [7].

  7. 7.

    https://github.com/cambridgeuniversity/mod_ucam_webauth.

  8. 8.

    https://github.com/cambridgeuniversity/ucam-webauth-php.

  9. 9.

    https://github.com/cambridgeuniversity/mod_ucam_webauth/commit/dd4fedbe8192e3b147d9cfe05c8373b2fd8c195e#diff-db9058c9017dbde922e625e3be2d6557.

  10. 10.

    https://github.com/cambridgeuniversity/ucam-webauth-php/commit/cd471c38612941c213716d4b7dd2dceff607bd04#diff-48bcdf5cb926243bf258df83114dd4e9.

  11. 11.

    http://php.net/manual/en/function.fopen.php.

  12. 12.

    http://php.net/manual/en/wrappers.data.php.

  13. 13.

    https://github.com/cambridgeuniversity/UcamWebauth-protocol/commit/3d71cc2840ef745aed8caaf5a565e48988d39fbd#diff-90c8938be2a4fc76543eae935d1a4f2b.

  14. 14.

    https://raven.cam.ac.uk/project/java-toolkit/.

  15. 15.

    https://apereo.github.io/cas/5.2.x/planning/Security-Guide.html#service-management.

  16. 16.

    https://hashcat.net/hashcat/.

  17. 17.

    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html.

  18. 18.

    https://uit.stanford.edu/service/saml/webauth-announce.

  19. 19.

    https://github.com/grymer/ngxraven.

References

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Malcolm Scott (University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory) for his contribution to the further development of the prototype nginx WAA. We would also like to thank Jon Warbrick, original designer of the Ucam Webauth protocol for many useful discussions.

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Correspondence to Graham Rymer .

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Rymer, G., Llewellyn-Jones, D. (2018). Raven Authentication Service. In: Matyáš, V., Švenda, P., Stajano, F., Christianson, B., Anderson, J. (eds) Security Protocols XXVI. Security Protocols 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11286. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03251-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03251-7_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03250-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-03251-7

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