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International Conference on Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering

SPACE 2018: Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering pp 177–197Cite as

Differential Fault Attack on SKINNY Block Cipher

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11348))

Abstract

SKINNY is a family of tweakable lightweight block ciphers, proposed in CRYPTO 2016. The proposal of SKINNY describes two block size variants of 64 and 128 bits as well as three options for tweakey. In this paper, we present differential fault analysis (DFA) of four SKINNY variants – SKINNY 64-64, SKINNY 128-128, SKINNY 64-128 and SKINNY 128-256. The attack model of tweakable block ciphers allow the access and full control of the tweak by the attacker. Respecting this attack model, we assume a fixed tweak for the attack window. With this assumption, extraction of the master key of SKINNY requires about 10 nibble fault injections on average for 64-bit versions of the cipher, whereas the 128-bit versions require roughly 21 byte fault injections. The attacks were validated through extensive simulation. To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first DFA attack on SKINNY tweakable block cipher family and, in fact, any practical realization of tweakable block ciphers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Throughout this paper, the array/state indices start from 1.

  2. 2.

    The terms tweakey and key have been used interchangeably throughout this paper, whereas to indicate the public material we use the term tweak.

  3. 3.

    Tweakey/key states and tweakey/key arrays have been used interchangeably with the same meaning in this work.

  4. 4.

    Note that in this paper we have used both the term difference and differential. Both have the same meaning in the context of this paper.

  5. 5.

    Actually this claim is not entirely true. In fact, depending on the value of the output differential, only a certain set of input differentials will satisfy the fault difference equation for this case, whose count is expected to be \(<\!2^s\). However, to exploit this observation a lot of fault injections will be required. As we shall show, that we can perform the attack with much less number of faults.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical Engineering Department, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran

    Navid Vafaei & Nasour Bagheri

  2. School of Computer Science, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran

    Nasour Bagheri

  3. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, Kharagpur, India

    Sayandeep Saha & Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

Authors
  1. Navid Vafaei
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  2. Nasour Bagheri
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  3. Sayandeep Saha
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  4. Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
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Correspondence to Nasour Bagheri .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Anupam Chattopadhyay

  2. Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India

    Chester Rebeiro

  3. University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia

    Yuval Yarom

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Vafaei, N., Bagheri, N., Saha, S., Mukhopadhyay, D. (2018). Differential Fault Attack on SKINNY Block Cipher. In: Chattopadhyay, A., Rebeiro, C., Yarom, Y. (eds) Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. SPACE 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11348. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05072-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05072-6_11

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