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International Conference on Information Systems Security

ICISS 2018: Information Systems Security pp 209–227Cite as

Secure Moderated Bargaining Game

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11281))

Abstract

Bargaining problem is one of the oldest problems in economics to explain the interaction between traders in variable pricing model. Many game theory approaches are used as solution over years. With proliferation of world wide web bargaining game is gaining relevance in online market places. Formal definition of an honest but curious mediator, in a three-party bargaining game is discussed in this paper. An honest but curious moderator facilitates the interaction between interested parties, but also wishes to learn information about the trade for his own benefit. An approach is also proposed to secure the bargain in the presence of an active adversary and honest but curious mediator, using Oblivious commitment based envelop protocol. It is shown that the protocol is IND-CCA secure and moderator cannot infer additional information of the trade except knowing the parties involved.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft India Private Limited, Hyderabad, India

    Sumanta Chatterjee

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  1. Sumanta Chatterjee
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Correspondence to Sumanta Chatterjee .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India

    Vinod Ganapathy

  2. Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA

    Trent Jaeger

  3. Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India

    R.K. Shyamasundar

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Chatterjee, S. (2018). Secure Moderated Bargaining Game. In: Ganapathy, V., Jaeger, T., Shyamasundar, R. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11281. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05171-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05171-6_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-05170-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-05171-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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