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Lorenzo Magnani, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
e-mail: lmagnani@unipv.it

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Selene Arfini

Ignorant Cognition

A Philosophical Investigation of the Cognitive
Features of Not-Knowing

Selene Arfini
Computational Philosophy Laboratory
Department of Humanities,
Philosophy Section
University of Pavia
Pavia, Italy

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To Nico

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Modena, Italy
October 2018

Selene Arfini

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