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Cathy Meadows: A Central Figure in Protocol Analysis

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Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11565))

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Abstract

This anecdotal note describes Cathy Meadow’s leadership role in formal specification and verification of cryptographic protocols. Cathy has been a central figure in protocol analysis through her significant research and successful efforts to bring researchers together to form a unified, cohesive, and effective community to design and evaluate cryptographic protocols.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, 94025, USA

    Sylvan Pinsky

Authors
  1. Sylvan Pinsky
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Correspondence to Sylvan Pinsky .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Joshua D. Guttman

  2. George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

    Carl E. Landwehr

  3. University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA

    José Meseguer

  4. University of Hawai'i, Honolulu, HI, USA

    Dusko Pavlovic

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Pinsky, S. (2019). Cathy Meadows: A Central Figure in Protocol Analysis. In: Guttman, J., Landwehr, C., Meseguer, J., Pavlovic, D. (eds) Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11565. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-19051-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-19052-1

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