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A Highly Secure MAC from Tweakable Blockciphers with Support for Short Tweaks

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11547))

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Abstract

Existing tweakable blockcipher (TBC)-based message authentication codes (MACs), in order to achieve full \(b\)-bit pseudo-random function (PRF) security, require a TBC with \(t\)-bit tweak and \(b\)-bit input block spaces such that \(b\le t\). An open problem from the previous works is to design a TBC-based MAC achieving the \(b\)-bit security even when \(b> t\). We present \(\mathsf {PMAC3}\), a TBC-based MAC achieving the \(b\)-bit security as long as \(b/2 \le t\).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    When security depends on both the numbers of queries and message lengths, the security level is measured by the number of blockcipher calls performed in a MAC. When it depends on only the number of queries, the security level is measured by the number of queries.

  2. 2.

    If \({I}(M^\alpha , M^\beta ) = \{I_1,i_2\}\), \({I}(M^\alpha , M^\gamma ) = \{I_3,i_4\}\) and \(i_1 = i_3 < i_2 = i_4\), then by \(M^\beta \ne M^\gamma \), \(i_1 \in {I}(M^\beta , M^\gamma )\) or \(i_2 \in {I}(M^\beta , M^\gamma )\). Thus, \(C_{I_1}^\beta \), \(C_{i_2}^\beta \) and \(C_{i_3}^\gamma \) are distinct or independent, or \(C_{i_1}^\beta \), \(C_{i_2}^\beta \) and \(C_{i_4}^\gamma \) are distinct or independent. Otherwise, there exist \(i_1,i_2 \in {I}(M^\alpha , M^\beta )\) and \(i_3, i_4 \in {I}(M^\alpha , M^\gamma )\) such that at least three of \((i_1, i_2, i_3,i_4)\) are distinct, thus at least three of \((C_{i_1}^\beta , C_{i_2}^\beta , C_{i_3}^\gamma , C_{i_4}^\gamma )\) are independent.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Kamakura, Kanagawa, Japan

    Yusuke Naito

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  1. Yusuke Naito
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Correspondence to Yusuke Naito .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

    Julian Jang-Jaccard

  2. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Fuchun Guo

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Naito, Y. (2019). A Highly Secure MAC from Tweakable Blockciphers with Support for Short Tweaks. In: Jang-Jaccard, J., Guo, F. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11547. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21548-4_32

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-21547-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-21548-4

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