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UC-Secure CRS Generation for SNARKs

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Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019 (AFRICACRYPT 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11627))

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Abstract

Zero-knowledge SNARKs (zk-SNARKs) have recently found various applications in verifiable computation and blockchain applications (Zerocash), but unfortunately they rely on a common reference string (CRS) that has to be generated by a trusted party. A standard suggestion, pursued by Ben Sasson et al. [IEEE S&P, 2015], is to generate CRS via a multi-party protocol. We enhance their CRS-generation protocol to achieve UC-security. This allows to safely compose the CRS-generation protocol with the zk-SNARK in a black-box manner with the insurance that the security of the zk-SNARK is not influenced. Differently from the previous work, the new CRS-generation protocol also avoids the random oracle model which is typically not required by zk-SNARKs themselves. As a case study, we apply the protocol to the state-of-the-art zk-SNARK by Groth [EUROCRYPT, 2016].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the RPK model, each party registers his public key with an authority of his choosing. It is assumed that even authorities of untrusted parties are honest to the extent that they verify the knowledge (e.g., by using a standalone ZK proof) of the corresponding secret key.

  2. 2.

    See https://www.zfnd.org/blog/conclusion-of-powers-of-tau/.

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Acknowledgement

The authors were supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreements No. 653497 (project PANORAMIX) and No. 780477 (project PRIViLEDGE), and by the Estonian Research Council grant (PRG49).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Behzad Abdolmaleki, Karim Baghery, Helger Lipmaa & Janno Siim

  2. Clearmatics, London, UK

    Michał Zając

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  1. Behzad Abdolmaleki
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  2. Karim Baghery
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Correspondence to Janno Siim .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Johannes Buchmann

  2. Université de Caen, Caen, France

    Abderrahmane Nitaj

  3. Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco

    Tajjeeddine Rachidi

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Abdolmaleki, B., Baghery, K., Lipmaa, H., Siim, J., Zając, M. (2019). UC-Secure CRS Generation for SNARKs. In: Buchmann, J., Nitaj, A., Rachidi, T. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2019. AFRICACRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11627. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23696-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23696-0_6

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