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International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America

LATINCRYPT 2017: Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2017 pp 271–288Cite as

The Oblivious Machine

Or: How to Put the C into MPC

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11368))

Abstract

We present an oblivious machine, a concrete notion for a multiparty random access machine (RAM) computation and a toolchain to allow the efficient execution of general programs written in a subset of C that allows RAM-model computation over the integers. The machine only leaks the list of possible instructions and the running time. Our work is based on the oblivious array for secret-sharing-based multiparty computation by Keller and Scholl (Asiacrypt ’14). This means that we only incur a polylogarithmic overhead over the execution on a CPU.

We describe an implementation of our construction using the Clang compiler from the LLVM project and the SPDZ protocol by Damgård et al. (Crypto ’12). The latter provides active security against a dishonest majority and works in the preprocessing model. The online phase clock rate of the resulting machine is 41 Hz for a memory size of 1024 64-bit integers and 2.2 Hz for a memory of \(2^{20}\) integers. Both timings have been taken for two parties in a local network. Similar work by other authors has only been in the semi-honest setting.

To further showcase our toolchain, we implemented and benchmarked private regular expression matching. Matching a string of length 1024 against a regular expression with 69270 transitions as a finite state machine takes seven hours online time, of which more than six hours are devoted to loading the reusable program.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    While there exist works on size-hiding secure computation [21], we do not think that those approaches are compatible with ours. In particular, they seem to be “one-shot” while ORAM requires continuous computation.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Peter Scholl for various comments and suggestions. This work has been supported in part by EPSRC via grants EP/I03126X, EP/M012824, and EP/N021940/1.

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  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Marcel Keller

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  1. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Tanja Lange

  2. University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

    Orr Dunkelman

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Keller, M. (2019). The Oblivious Machine. In: Lange, T., Dunkelman, O. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2017. LATINCRYPT 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11368. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25283-0_15

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