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Gavel: A Sanctioning Enforcement Framework

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Book cover Engineering Multi-Agent Systems (EMAS 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 11375))

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Abstract

Sanctioning is one of the most adopted enforcement mechanisms in the governance of multiagent systems. Current enforcement frameworks, however, restrict agents to reason about and make sanctioning decisions. We developed the Gavel framework, an adaptive sanctioning enforcement framework that enables agents to decide for the most appropriate sanction to apply depending on various decision factors. The potential benefits and use of the framework are shown using a Public Goods Game in which agents are endowed with different strategies combining material and reputational sanctions.

Igor Conrado Alves de Lima was fully supported by CNPq, Brazil, grant number 131120/2016-6.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See [2] for an extended taxonomy of norm enforcement mechanisms.

  2. 2.

    Source code available at https://github.com/gavelproject/gavel/.

  3. 3.

    Source code available at https://github.com/gavelproject/gavel-jacamo/.

  4. 4.

    Source code available at https://github.com/gavelproject/pgg/.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Inst. de Matemática e Estatística, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, SP, Brazil

    Igor Conrado Alves de Lima

  2. Department of Informatics, Brandenburg University of Technology, Cottbus, Germany

    Luis Gustavo Nardin

  3. LTI, Escola Politécnica, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, SP, Brazil

    Igor Conrado Alves de Lima & Jaime Simão Sichman

Authors
  1. Igor Conrado Alves de Lima
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  2. Luis Gustavo Nardin
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  3. Jaime Simão Sichman
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Correspondence to Igor Conrado Alves de Lima .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Danny Weyns

  2. Department of Computer Science, Bioengineering, Robotics and Systems Engineering, Università degli Studi di Genova, Genoa, Italy

    Viviana Mascardi

  3. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Bologna, Cesena, Forli/Cesana, Italy

    Alessandro Ricci

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de Lima, I.C.A., Nardin, L.G., Sichman, J.S. (2019). Gavel: A Sanctioning Enforcement Framework. In: Weyns, D., Mascardi, V., Ricci, A. (eds) Engineering Multi-Agent Systems. EMAS 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11375. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25693-7_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25693-7_12

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