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Security, Privacy, and Usability Challenges in Selfie Biometrics

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Selfie Biometrics

Part of the book series: Advances in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition ((ACVPR))

Abstract

From biometric image acquisition to matching to decision making, designing a selfie biometric system is riddled with security, privacy, and usability challenges. In this chapter, we provide a discussion of some of these challenges, examine some real-world examples, and discuss both existing solutions and potential new solutions. The majority of these issues will be discussed in the context of mobile devices, as they comprise a major platform for selfie biometrics; face, voice, and fingerprint biometric modalities are the most popular modalities used with mobile devices.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the students in our research laboratory for their assistance in developing and implementing the approaches discussed in this chapter—specifically, Narciso Sandico, Sadun Muhi, and Eryu Suo. We would additionally like to thank Maria Villa and Bryan Villa for their illustrative work in Fig. 16.5.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, California State University, Fullerton, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA, 92831, USA

    Mikhail Gofman

  2. Department of Information Systems and Decision Sciences, California State University, Fullerton, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA, 92831, USA

    Sinjini Mitra

  3. Department of Computer Engineering, 800 N State College Blvd, Fullerton, CA, 92831, USA

    Yu Bai & Yoonsuk Choi

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  1. Mikhail Gofman
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  2. Sinjini Mitra
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  3. Yu Bai
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  4. Yoonsuk Choi
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Correspondence to Mikhail Gofman .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Wichita State University, Wichita, KS, USA

    Ajita Rattani

  2. Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Missouri-Kansas City, Kansas City, MO, USA

    Reza Derakhshani

  3. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

    Arun Ross

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Gofman, M., Mitra, S., Bai, Y., Choi, Y. (2019). Security, Privacy, and Usability Challenges in Selfie Biometrics. In: Rattani, A., Derakhshani, R., Ross, A. (eds) Selfie Biometrics. Advances in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26972-2_16

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