Abstract
This paper considers a recently introduced model for socially-contingent decision-making and addresses the connection between influences on individual decision-making and the statistical, information-theoretic properties associated with such decision-making dynamics on a social network. In particular, we analytically show, on a few simple examples, the correspondence between coordinating influences and positively correlated models which in turn correspond to models with entropy that decreases monotonically in the strength of the influences. Moreover, we discuss numerical results that suggest asymmetric yet coordinating influences may converge to a frustrated equilibrium.
M. G. Reyes—Independent Researcher and Consultant.
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Notes
- 1.
For the reader who wishes to verify this claim, the author recommends first computing Z for zero, one, and two direct biases, then finally for three direct biases.
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A Appendix: Sketches of Derivations
A Appendix: Sketches of Derivations
Note that to determine whether a particular covariance is positive or negative, one needs to determine the sign of the numerator, which we creatively refer to as numerator. For both the chain and the cycle, numerator will be a product of factors, one of which will be positive or negative depending on whether the direct biases agree in polarity, another of which will be positive or negative depending on whether there are an odd or an even number of negative edges between the two direct biases.
Each factor in numerator will be a sum of terms, each of term of which itself a product \(\sinh {\uptheta }\)’s and \(\cosh {\uptheta }\)’s, where \({\uptheta }\) is a direct or social bias. Without loss of generality, we simplify analysis by assuming uniform social biases, i.e., \({\uptheta }_{i,i+1} = {\uptheta }\). For both a chain and a cycle, direct biases are zero, except for two sites. In the chain, the nonzero direct biases are at sites 1 and N, the ends of the chain. In the cycle, the nonzero direct biases are at sites 1 and \(k < N\). In the interest of space, we will economize notation by letting \(C_{{\uptheta }} \,{{\mathop {=}\limits ^{\varDelta }}}\,\cosh {\uptheta }\) and \(S_{{\uptheta }} \,{{\mathop {=}\limits ^{\varDelta }}}\,\sinh {\uptheta }\) when \({\uptheta }\) is a social bias, and \(C_i \,{{\mathop {=}\limits ^{\varDelta }}}\,\cosh {\uptheta }_i\) and \(S_i \,{{\mathop {=}\limits ^{\varDelta }}}\,\sinh {\uptheta }_i\) when \({\uptheta }_i\) is a nonzero direct bias at site i.
1.1 A.1 Theorems 1 and 2
Proof
(Theorem 1). Using the concept of the transfer matrix [3], one can compute the partition function \(Z({\varvec{{\uptheta }}})\) as
\(\square \)
We now sketch a proof that \({\varvec{t}}\) is positively correlated if and only if \({\varvec{t}}\) is non-frustrated.
Proof
(Theorem 2). We will determine the sign of numerator for the covariance \(\mathbf{{cov}}\left( t_1,t_{12}\right) \) between statistics \(t_1(x_1)\) and \(t_{12}(x_1,x_2)\). In the case that \({\uptheta }_1 > 0\) and \({\uptheta }_N > 0\), it is straightforward to show
The first factor \(C_N S_N\) is positive since \({\uptheta }_N > 0\). The third factor, \(C_1^2 - S_1^2\), is positive for all \({\uptheta }_1\).
Consider the middle factor, \(C_{{\uptheta }}^{N-1} C_{{\uptheta }} S_{{\uptheta }}^{N-2} - S_{{\uptheta }} C_{{\uptheta }}^{N-2} S_{{\uptheta }}^{N-1}\). There are four cases to consider. First, whether there are an odd or even number of negative edges in the chain. For each of these cases, whether the social bias \({\uptheta }_{12}\) is positive or negative. One can see that when there are an odd number of negative edges on the chain
and when there are an even number of negative edges along the chain,
Combining this with (13), we see that \(\mathbf{{cov}}\left( t_1,t_{12}\right) < 0\) when \({\varvec{t}}\) is frustrated and \(\mathbf{{cov}}\left( t_1,t_{12}\right) > 0\) is non-frustrated. Note, however, that in order to show positive correlation, one has to show that all covariances are positive when \({\varvec{t}}\) is non-frustrated. By recalling (13), one can convince themselves that this is the case.
The case where \({\uptheta }_1 < 0\) and \({\uptheta }_N > 0\) follows similarly, though one should recall (10) and (11) for sign reversals. \(\square \)
1.2 A.2 Proof Sketch for Theorem 4
The concept of the transfer matrix can again be used to compute the partition function \(Z({\varvec{{\uptheta }}})\) in the case of an Ising model on a cycle. However, one does so by conditioning on a particular site, say \(i_0\), and computing the respective conditional partition functions \(Z_{i_0}^{(A)}\) and \(Z_{i_0}^{(B)}\) corresponding to conditioning that \(x_{i_0} = 1\) and \(X_{i_0} = -1\). Then, \(Z = Z_{i_0}^{(A)} + Z_{i_0}^{(B)}\). We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Consider a cycle with M direct biases, at sites \(i_1,\dots ,i_M\). The conditional partition function \(Z_{i_0}^{(A)}\) and \(Z_{i_0}^{(B)}\) are, respectively,
Proof
We will prove (14) by induction. It is straightforwardFootnote 1 to verify the conclusion of the lemma in the case of three direct biases, which establishes the base step. That is, the statement holds for some \(M\le N\). For the inductive step, we will first compute \(Z_{i_0}^{(A)}\) as a function of the message \(\overline{m}\) from site \(i_M\) to site \(i_M + 1\), and establish a relationship between \(\overline{m}\) and \(Z_{i_0}^{(A)}\) in the base case. We will then compute \(Z_{i_0}^{(A)}\) as a function of \(\overline{m}\) in the inductive case of \(M + 1\) direct biases. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that for all \(\{i,i+1\}\), \({\uptheta }_{ij} = {\uptheta }\).
Suppose there are M direct biases. We compute \(Z_{i_0}^{(A)}\) by conditioning on site \(i_0 = 0\). The sites where there exist direct biases are enumerated as \(i_1,\ldots ,i_M\). Moreover, let \(\varDelta \) be the distance from \(i_M\) to \(i_0\) in the ‘forward’ direction, i.e., the direction in which no other direct biases exist between \(i_M\) and \(i_0\). One can show that
Equating this with (14), which is established for the case of M direct biases, one can see that
Now consider the inductive case of \(M+1\) direct biases, where \(i_1\ldots ,i_M\) are as they were in the base case, and \(i_{M+1} > i_M\), i.e., it is the only direct bias between \(i_M\) and \(i_0\). Note that \(\overline{m}\) is the same as in the base case of M direct biases, and therefore hence \(\overline{m}(A) - \overline{m}(B)\) and \(\overline{m}(A) + \overline{m}(B)\) are the same as well. One can show that
Substituting (15) and (16) establishes (14) for the inductive case of \(M+1\) direct biases. \(\square \)
We now sketch a proof of Theorem 4.
Proof
(Theorem 4). Let \({\uptheta }_1\) and \({\uptheta }_2\) denote the non-zero direct biases on the cycle. We assume that \({\uptheta }_2 > 0\). We will consider four cases. First, whether \({\uptheta }_1 < 0\) or \({\uptheta }_1 > 0\). Second, whether there are an odd or even number of anti-coordinating social biases along each path between \(i_1\) and \(i_2\).
In the case that \({\uptheta }_1 < 0\),
where it is straightforward to verify that
If there are an odd number of anti-coordinating social biases along each path connecting \(i_1\) and \(i_2\),
while if there are an even number of anti-coordinating social biases along each path connecting \(i_1\) and \(i_2\), we have
Substituting (18) into (17) shows that when the two direct biases are of opposite polarity, and there are an odd number of anti-coordinating social along each path connecting \(i_1\) and \(i_2\), then the covariance between \(t_1\) and \(t_2\) is positive. Substituting (19) into (17) shows that when the two direct biases oppose in polarity, and there are an even number of anti-coordinating social biases along each path connecting \(i_1\) and \(i_2\), then the covariance between \(t_1\) and \(t_2\) is negative.
In the case that \({\uptheta }_1 > 0\),
where one can verify that
Substituting (18) and (19) into (20) will yield analogous results. \(\square \)
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Reyes, M.G. (2020). Frustrated Equilibrium of Asymmetric Coordinating Dynamics in a Marketing Game. In: Bi, Y., Bhatia, R., Kapoor, S. (eds) Intelligent Systems and Applications. IntelliSys 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1037. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29516-5_12
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