Abstract
Many voter-verifiable, coercion-resistant schemes have been proposed, but even the most carefully designed systems necessarily leak information via the announced result. In corner cases, this may be problematic. For example, if all the votes go to one candidate then all vote privacy evaporates. The mere possibility of candidates getting no or few votes could have implications for security in practice: if a coercer demands that a voter cast a vote for such an unpopular candidate, then the voter may feel obliged to obey, even if she is confident that the voting system satisfies the standard coercion resistance definitions. With complex ballots, there may also be a danger of “Italian” style (aka “signature”) attacks: the coercer demands the voter cast a ballot with a specific, identifying pattern.
Here we propose an approach to tallying end-to-end verifiable schemes that avoids revealing all the votes but still achieves whatever confidence level in the announced result is desired. Now a coerced voter can claim that the required vote must be amongst those that remained shrouded. Our approach is based on the well-established notion of Risk-Limiting Audits, but here applied to the tally rather than to the audit. We show that this approach counters coercion threats arising in extreme tallies and “Italian” attacks. We illustrate our approach by applying it to the Selene scheme, and we extend the approach to Risk-Limiting Verification, where not all vote trackers are revealed, thereby enhancing the coercion mitigation properties of Selene.
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Notes
- 1.
The trustworthiness of the underlying records should be assessed by a compliance audit [25]. A RLA that relies on an untrustworthy record cannot reliably assess whether outcomes reflect how voters voted.
- 2.
In our case, the items will be ballots, and their labels will represent votes; see Sect. 4.2.
- 3.
Private communication.
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Acknowledgements
WJ and PYAR acknowledge the support of the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) and the National Centre for Research and Development (NCBiR Poland) under the INTER/PolLux project VoteVerif (POLLUX-IV/1/2016). PBR was supported by the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 779391 (FutureTPM).
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Jamroga, W., Roenne, P.B., Ryan, P.Y.A., Stark, P.B. (2019). Risk-Limiting Tallies. In: Krimmer, R., et al. Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11759. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30625-0_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30625-0_12
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