Lecture Notes in Computer Science

11800

Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen

Editorial Board Members

David Hutchison, UK Josef Kittler, UK Friedemann Mattern, Switzerland Moni Naor, Israel Bernhard Steffen, Germany Doug Tygar, USA Takeo Kanade, USA Jon M. Kleinberg, USA John C. Mitchell, USA C. Pandu Rangan, India Demetri Terzopoulos, USA

Formal Methods

Subline of Lectures Notes in Computer Science

Subline Series Editors

Ana Cavalcanti, *University of York, UK*Marie-Claude Gaudel, *Université de Paris-Sud, France*

Subline Advisory Board

Manfred Broy, *TU Munich, Germany*Annabelle McIver, *Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia*Peter Müller, *ETH Zurich, Switzerland*Erik de Vink, *Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands*Pamela Zave, *AT&T Laboratories Research, Bedminster, NJ, USA*

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/7408

Maurice H. ter Beek · Annabelle McIver · José N. Oliveira (Eds.)

Formal Methods – The Next 30 Years

Third World Congress, FM 2019 Porto, Portugal, October 7–11, 2019 Proceedings



Editors
Maurice H. ter Beek
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
Pisa, Italy

José N. Oliveira D University of Minho Braga, Portugal Annabelle McIver

Macquarie University

Sydney, NSW, Australia

ISSN 0302-9743 ISSN 1611-3349 (electronic) Lecture Notes in Computer Science ISBN 978-3-030-30941-1 ISBN 978-3-030-30942-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30942-8

LNCS Sublibrary: SL2 - Programming and Software Engineering

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This volume contains the papers presented at the 23rd Symposium on Formal Methods (FM 2019), held in Porto, Portugal, in the form of the Third World Congress on Formal Methods, during October 7–11, 2019. These proceedings also contain five papers selected by the Program Committee (PC) of the Industry Day (I-Day).

FM 2019 was organized under the auspices of Formal Methods Europe (FME), an independent association whose aim is to stimulate the use of, and research on, formal methods for software development. It has been more than 30 years since the first VDM symposium in 1987 brought together researchers with the common goal of creating methods to produce high-quality software based on rigor and reason. Since then the diversity and complexity of computer technology has changed enormously and the formal methods community has stepped up to the challenges those changes brought by adapting, generalizing, and improving the models and analysis techniques that were the focus of that first symposium. The theme for FM 2019, "The Next 30 Years," was a reflection on how far the community has come and the lessons we can learn for understanding and developing the best software for future technologies.

To reflect the fact that it has been 20 years since FM 1999 in Toulouse and 10 years since FM 2009 in Eindhoven, FM 2019 was organized as a World Congress, and we composed a PC of renowned scientists from 42 different countries spread across all continents except for Antarctica. We originally received a stunning total of 185 abstract submissions, which unfortunately resulted in 'only' 129 paper submissions from 36 different countries. Each submission went through a rigorous review process in which 95% of the papers were reviewed by four PC members. Following an in-depth discussion phase lasting two weeks, we selected 37 full papers and 2 short tool papers, an acceptance rate of 30%, for presentation during the symposium and inclusion in these proceedings. The symposium featured keynotes by Shriram Krishnamurthi (Brown University, USA), Erik Poll (Radboud University, The Netherlands), and June Andronick (CSIRO-Data61 and UNSW, Australia). We hereby thank these invited speakers for having accepted our invitation. The program also featured a Lucas Award and FME Fellowship Award Ceremony.

We are grateful to all involved in FM 2019. In particular the PC members and subreviewers for their accurate and timely reviewing, all authors for their submissions, and all attendees of the symposium for their participation. We also thank all the other committees (I-Day, Doctoral Symposium, Journal First Track, Workshops, and Tutorials), itemized on the following pages, and particularly the excellent local organization and publicity teams. In addition to FM 2019 they also managed the FM week consisting of another 8 conferences, 17 workshops, and 7 tutorials, as well as 'X', the secret project of a colloquium in honor of Stefania Gnesi based on a Festschrift to celebrate her 65th birthday.

We are very grateful to our platinum sponsors: Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google, and Sony; our gold sponsors: Springer, Semmle, ASML, and PT-FLAD Chair

in Smart Cities & Smart Governance; our silver sponsors: Oracle Labs, Runtime Verification Inc., Standard Chartered, GMV, United Technologies Research Center (UTRC), and Efacec; our bronze sponsors i2S, Foundations of Perspicuous Software Systems Collaborative Research Center, and the Mathematical research center of the University of Porto (CMUP); and our basic sponsors: Natixis and Neadvance.

Finally, we thank Springer for publishing these proceedings in their FM subline and we acknowledge the support from EasyChair in assisting us in managing the complete process from submissions to these proceedings to the program.

August 2019

Maurice H. ter Beek Annabelle McIver José N. Oliveira

Organization

General Chair

José N. Oliveira University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal

FM Program Chairs

Maurice H. ter Beek ISTI-CNR, Italy

Annabelle McIver Macquarie University, Australia

Industry Day Chairs

Joe Kiniry Galois Inc., USA Thierry Lecomte ClearSy, France

Doctoral Symposium Chairs

Alexandra Silva University College London, UK Antónia Lopes University of Lisbon, Portugal

Journal First Track Chair

Augusto Sampaio Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil

Workshop and Tutorial Chairs

Emil Sekerinski McMaster University, Canada Nelma Moreira University of Porto, Portugal

FM Program Committee

Bernhard Aichernig TU Graz, Austria

Elvira Albert Complutense University of Madrid, Spain María Alpuente Polytechnic University of Valencia, Spain

Dalal Alrajeh Imperial College, UK

Mário S. Alvim Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil

June Andronick CSIRO-Data61, Australia Christel Baier TU Dresden, Germany

Luís Barbosa University of Minho and UN University, Portugal

Gilles Barthe IMDEA Software Institute, Spain
Marcello Bersani Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy

Gustavo Betarte Tilsor SA and University of the Republic, Uruguay

Nikolaj Bjørner Microsoft Research, USA Frank de Boer CWI, The Netherlands

Sergiy Bogomolov Australian National University, Australia

Julien Brunel ONERA, France

Néstor Cataño Universidad del Norte, Colombia

Ana Cavalcanti University of York, UK

Antonio Cerone Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan Marsha Chechik University of Toronto, Canada

David Chemouil ONERA, France Alessandro Cimatti FBK–IRST, Italy

Alcino Cunha University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal

Michael Dierkes Rockwell Collins, France
Alessandro Fantechi University of Florence, Italy

Carla Ferreira New University of Lisbon, Portugal

João Ferreira Teesside University, UK

José L. Fiadeiro Royal Holloway University of London, UK Marcelo Frias Buenos Aires Institute of Technology, Argentina

Fatemeh Ghassemi University of Tehran, Iran Silvia Ghilezan University of Novi Sad, Serbia

Stefania Gnesi ISTI–CNR, Italy

Reiner Hähnle TU Darmstadt, Germany

Osman Hasan University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan

Klaus Havelund NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, USA

Anne Haxthausen TU Denmark, Denmark

Ian Hayes
University of Queensland, Australia
Naval Research Laboratory, USA
University of Edinburgh, UK
University of Southampton, UK
University of Southampton, UK
National Institute of Informatics, Japan
Vietnam National University, Vietnam

Atsushi Igarashi Kyoto University, Japan
Suman Jana Columbia University, USA
Ali Jaoua Qatar University, Qatar
Einar Broch Johnsen University of Oslo, Norway

Joost-Pieter Katoen RWTH Aachen University, Germany

Laura Kovács TU Vienna, Austria Axel Legay UCLouvain, Belgium

Gabriele Lenzini University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg Yang Liu Nanyang Technical University, Singapore

Alberto Lluch Lafuente TU Denmark, Denmark
Malte Lochau TU Darmstadt, Germany
Michele Loreti University of Camerino, Italy

Anastasia Mavridou NASA Ames, USA

Hernán Melgratti University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

Sun Meng Peking University, China

Dominique Méry LORIA and University of Lorraine, France

Rosemary Monahan Maynooth University, Ireland Olfa Mosbahi University of Carthage, Tunisia University of Leicester, UK Mohammad Mousavi NASA Langley, USA César Muñoz Brown University, USA Tim Nelson Gethin Norman University of Glasgow, UK D-RisO Software Systems, UK Colin O'Halloran University of Chile, Chile Federico Olmedo University of Malta, Malta Gordon Pace Jan Peleska University of Bremen, Germany

Marielle Petit-Doche Systerel, France

Alexandre Petrenko Computer Research Institute of Montréal, Canada

Anna Philippou University of Cyprus, Cyprus

Jorge Sousa Pinto University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal

André Platzer Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Jaco van de Pol Aarhus University, Denmark
Tahiry Rabehaja Macquarie University, Australia
Steve Reeves University of Waikato, New Zealand
Matteo Rossi Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy
Augusto Sampaio Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil
Gerardo Schneider Chalmers University of Gothenburg, Sweden

Daniel Schwartz Narbonne
Natasha Sharygina
Nikolay Shilov
Ana Sokolova

Amazon Web Services, USA
University of Lugano, Switzerland
Innopolis University, Russia
University of Salzburg, Austria

Marielle Stoelinga University of Twente, The Netherlands

Jun Sun University of Technology and Design, Singapore

Helen Treharne University of Surrey, UK

Elena Troubitsyna Äbo Akademi University, Finland Reykjavik University, Iceland Andrea Vandin TU Denmark, Denmark

R. Venkatesh TCS Research, India

Erik de Vink

TU Eindhoven and CWI, The Netherlands
Willem Visser

Stellenbosch University, South Africa
Farn Wang

Bruce Watson

Stellenbosch University, Taiwan

Stellenbosch University, South Africa
Tim Willemse

TU Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Kirsten Winter

University of Queensland, Australia

Jim Woodcock University of York, UK

Lijun Zhang Chinese Academy of Sciences, China

Additional Reviewers

Rui Abreu Arthur Américo Hugo Araujo Myla Archer Sepideh Asadi Florent Avellaneda Eduard Baranov Davide Basile Cláudio Belo Lourenço Philipp Berger František Blahoudek Martin Blicha Jean-Paul Bodeveix Brandon Bohrer Ioana Boureanu Laura Bozzelli Daniel Britten James Brotherston Richard Bubel Doina Bucur Juan Diego Campo Laura Carnevali Gustavo Carvalho Davide Cavezza Xiaohong Chen

Jesús Correas Fernández Silvano Dal Zilio

Carlos Diego Damasceno

Quoc Huy Do Sebastian Ehmes Santiago Escobar Marco Faella Paul Fiterau Brostean Simon Foster Maria João Frade

Yu-Ting Chen

Robert Colvin

Maciej Gazda Lorenzo Gheri Eduardo Giménez Pablo Gordillo Gloria Gori Friedrich Gretz Jerry den Hartog Raju Halder Hossein Hojjat Karel Horak Zhe Hou Thomas Hujsa Andreas Humenberger

Antti Hyvarinen

Peter Häfner

Fabian Immler

Miguel Isabel
Shaista Jabeen
Phillip James
Seema Jehan
Saul Johnson
Violet Ka I Pun
Eduard Kamburjan

Minh-Thang Khuu Sascha Klüppelholz Dimitrios Kouzapas

Robbert Krebbers Shrawan Kumar Luca Laurenti Maurice Laveaux Corey Lewis

Jianlin Li
Yi Li
Yong Li
Ai Liu
Wanwei Liu
Martin Lukac
Carlos Luna
Lars Luthmann
Joshua Moerman
Hendrik Maarand
Kumar Madhukar

Kumar Madhukar Shahar Maoz Matteo Marescotti Bojan Marinkovic Paolo Masci Mieke Massink Franco Mazzanti Larissa Meinicke Alexandra Mendes Stephan Merz Ravindra Metta Andrea Micheli Stefan Mitsch Alvaro Miyazawa Carroll Morgan Mariano Moscato Toby Murray David Müller Koji Nakazawa Pham Ngoc Hung Omer Nguena-Timo

Paul Piho

Hans de Nivelle

Ouentin Peyras

Danny Bøgsted Poulsen

James Power Tim Quatmann Jean-Baptiste Raclet Markus Roggenbach Guillermo Román-Díez

Jurriaan Rot
Albert Rubio
Enno Ruijters
Sebastian Ruland
David Sanan
Julia Sapiña
Andy Schürr
Ramy Shahin
Neeraj Singh
Andrew Sogokon
B. Srivathsan
Dominic Steinhöfel

Ivan Stojic Sandro Stucki Martin Tappler Laura Titolo Inna Vistbakka Stephan Wesemeyer Andrea Turrini Matthias Volk Pengfei Yang Ben Tyler Jingyi Wang Haodong Yao Evangelia Vanezi Shuling Wang

Markus Weckesser

I-Day Program Committee

Alicia Villanueva

M. Antony Aiello AdaCore, USA Flemming Andersen Galois Inc., USA

Stylianos Basagianni United Technologies Research Centre, Ireland

Roderick Chapman Protean Code Limited, UK

David Cok GrammaTech, USA

Alessandro Fantechi University of Florence, Italy

Chris Hawblitzel Microsoft, USA

Peter Gorm Larsen Aarhus University, Denmark
Michael Leuschel University of Düsseldorf, Germany

Yannick Moy AdaCore, France

Jan Peleska Verified Systems International GmbH, Germany

Etienne Prun ClearSy, France

Kenji Taguchi CAV Technologies Co., Ltd., Japan

Stefano Tonetta FBK–IRST, Italy Daniel Zimmerman Galois Inc., USA

DS Program Committee

Ana Cavalcanti University of York, UK

André Platzer Carnegie Mellon University, USA

Lipiyarsity of Elegance Italy

University of Elegance Italy

Alessandro Fantechi University of Florence, Italy

Carlo A. Furia
USI, Switzerland
Dalal Alrajeh
Imperial College, UK
University of Oslo, Norway

Elvira Albert Complutense University of Madrid, Spain

Jaco van de Pol Aarhus University, Denmark

Matteo Rossi Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy

Stefania Gnesi ISTI-CNR, Italy Stephan Merz Inria, France

JFT Program Committee

Cliff Jones University of Newcastle, UK

Manfred Broy TU Munich, Germany

Organizing Committee

Luís Soares Barbosa University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal José Creissac Campos University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal University of Porto and INESC TEC, Portugal João Pascoal Faria University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal Sara Fernandes Luís Neves Critical Software, Portugal

University of Porto and INESC TEC, Portugal Ana Paiva

Local Organizers

Catarina Fernandes University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal Paula Rodrigues INESC TEC, Portugal

INESC TEC, Portugal Ana Rita Costa

Web Team

Francisco Neves University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal Rogério Pontes University of Minho and INESC TEC, Portugal

Paula Rodrigues INESC TEC, Portugal

FME Board

Ana Cavalcanti University of York, UK Uppsala University, Sweden Lars-Henrik Eriksson Stefania Gnesi

ISTI-CNR, Italy

Einar Broch Johnsen University of Oslo, Norway Thanos. The Netherlands Nico Plat

Formal Methods for Security Functionality and for Secure Functionality (Invited Presentation)

Erik Poll

Digital Security group, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands erikpoll@cs.ru.nl

With cyber security becoming a growing concern, it has naturally attracted the attention of researchers in formal methods. One recent success story here is TLS: the development of the new TLS 1.3 specification has gone hand-in-hand with efforts to verify security properties of formal models [5] and the development of a fully verified implementation [3]. Earlier well-known success stories in using formal methods for security are the verifications of operating system kernels or hypervisors, namely seL4 [7] and Microsoft's Hyper-V [10].

These examples – security protocols and OS kernels – are applications whose primary purpose is to provide security. It is natural to apply formal methods to such systems: they are by their very nature security-critical and they provide some security functionality that we can try to specify and verify.

However, we want *all* our systems to be secure, not just these security systems. There is an important difference between *secure* functionality and *security* functionality, or – given that most functionality and most security problems are down to software – between *software security* and *security software* [11]. Many, if not most, security problems arise in systems that have no specific security objective, say PDF viewers or video players, but which can still be hacked to provide attackers with unwanted functionality they can abuse.

Using formal methods to prove security is probably not on the cards of something as complex as a PDF viewer or video player. Just defining what it would mean for such a system to be secure is probably already infeasible. Still, formal methods can be useful, to prove the absence of certain types of security flaws or simply find security flaws. Successes here have been in the use of static analysis in source code analysers, e.g. tools like Fortify SCA that look for flaws in web applications and tools like Coverity that look for memory vulnerabilities in C(++) code. Another successful application of formal methods is the use of symbolic (or concolic) execution to generate test cases for security testing, as in SAGE [6] or, going one step further, not just automatically finding flaws but also automatically generating exploits, as in angr [16].

Downside of these approaches is that they are post-hoc and can only look for flaws in existing code. The *LangSec* paradigm [4, 9], on the other hand, provides ideas on how to prevent many security problems *by construction*. Key insights are that most security flaws occur in input handling and that there are several root causes in play here. Firstly, the input languages involved (e.g. file formats and network protocols) are complex, very expressive, and poorly, informally, specified. Secondly, there are *many*

of these input languages, sometimes nested or stacked. Finally, parsers for these languages are typically hand-written, with parsing code scattered throughout the application code in so-called shotgun parsers [12]. With clearer, formal specifications of input languages and generated parser code much security misery could be avoided. (Recent initiatives in tools for parser generation here include Hammer [1] and Nail [2].) Given that formal languages and parser generation are some of the most basic and established formal methods around, it is a bit of an embarrassment to us as formal methods community that sloppy language specifications and hand-coded parsers should cause so many security problems.

Some security flaws in input handling are not so much caused by *buggy* parsing of inputs, but rather by the *unexpected* parsing of input [13]. Classic examples of this are command injection, SQL injection, and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Tell-tale sign that unwanted parsing of input may be happening in unexpected places is the heavy use of strings as data types [14].

Information or data flow analysis can be used to detect such flaws; indeed, this is a standard technique used in the source code analysis tools mentioned above. These flaws can also be prevented by construction, namely by using type systems. A recent example of this is the 'Trusted Types' browser API [8] by Google, where different types are used to track different kinds of data and different trust level of data to prevent XSS vulnerabilities, esp. the DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities that have proved so difficult to root out.

To conclude, formal methods cannot only be used to *prove* security of security-critical applications and components – i.e. the security software –, but they can be much more widely used to *improve* security by ruling out of the root causes behind security flaws in input handling, and do so by construction, and hence improve software security in general. Moreover, some very basic and lightweight formal methods can be used for this: methods that we teach – or should be teaching – our students in the first years of their Bachelor degree, such as regular expressions, finite state machines, grammars, and types. Indeed, in my own research I have been surprised to see how useful the simple notion of finite state machine for describing input sequences is to discover security flaws [15].

That we have not been able to get these basic techniques into common use does not say much for our success in transferring formal methods to software engineering practice. Still, looking at the bright side, it does suggest opportunities for improvement.

References

- 1. Anantharaman, P., Millian, M.C., Bratus, S., Patterson, M.L.: Input handling done right: building hardened parsers using language-theoretic security. In: Cybersecurity Development (SecDev), pp. 4–5. IEEE (2017)
- Bangert, J., Zeldovich, N.: Nail: A practical tool for parsing and generating data formats. In: OSDI 2014, pp. 615–628. Usenix (2014)

- Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Kobeissi, N.: Verified models and reference implementations for the TLS 1.3 standard candidate. In: Security and Privacy (S&P 2017), pp. 483–502. IEEE (2017)
- Bratus, S., Locasto, M.E., Patterson, M.L., Sassaman, L., Shubina, A.: Exploit programming: from buffer overflows to weird machines and theory of computation. Login, 13–21 (2011)
- 5. Cremers, C., Horvat, M., Hoyland, J., Scott, S., van der Merwe, T.: A comprehensive symbolic analysis of TLS 1.3. In: SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2017), pp. 1773–1788. ACM (2017)
- Godefroid, P., Levin, M.Y., Molnar, D.: SAGE: Whitebox fuzzing for security testing. Commun. ACM 55(3), 40–44 (2012)
- 7. Klein, G., et al.: seL4: Formal verification of an OS kernel. In: ACM SIGOPS, pp. 207–220. ACM (2009)
- 8. Kotowicz, K.: Trusted types help prevent cross-site scripting (2019). https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2019/02/trusted-types. blog
- 9. LangSec: Recognition, validation, and compositional correctness for real world security (2013). http://langsec.org/bof-handout.pdf. uSENIX Security BoF hand-out
- Leinenbach, D., Santen, T.: Verifying the microsoft hyper-V hypervisor with VCC. In: Cavalcanti, A., Dams, D.R. (eds.) FM 2009, LNCS, vol. 5850, pp. 806–809. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05089-3_51
- 11. McGraw, G.: Software security. IEEE Secur. Priv. **2**(2), 80–83 (2004)
- 12. Momot, F., Bratus, S., Hallberg, S.M., Patterson, M.L.: The seven turrets of Babel: a taxonomy of LangSec errors and how to expunge them. In: Cybersecurity Development (SecDev 2016), pp. 45–52. IEEE (2016)
- 13. Poll, E.: LangSec revisited: input security flaws of the second kind. In: Workshop on Language-Theoretic Security (LangSec 2018). IEEE (2018)
- 14. Poll, E.: Strings considered harmful. Login, **43**(4), 21–26 (2018)
- 15. Poll, E., de Ruiter, J., Schubert, A.: Protocol state machines and session languages: specification, implementation, and security flaws. In: Workshop on Language-Theoretic Security (LangSec 2015), pp. 125–133. IEEE (2015)
- 16. Shoshitaishvili, Y., et al.: SoK:(state of) the art of war: offensive techniques in binary analysis. In: Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 2016), pp. 138–157. IEEE (2016)

Contents

Invited Presentations	
The Human in Formal Methods	3
Successes in Deployed Verified Software (and Insights on Key Social Factors)	11
Verification	
Provably Correct Floating-Point Implementation of a Point-in-Polygon Algorithm	21
Formally Verified Roundoff Errors Using SMT-based Certificates and Subdivisions	38
Mechanically Verifying the Fundamental Liveness Property of the Chord Protocol	45
On the Nature of Symbolic Execution	64
Synthesis Techniques	
GR(1)*: GR(1) Specifications Extended with Existential Guarantees Gal Amram, Shahar Maoz, and Or Pistiner	83
Counterexample-Driven Synthesis for Probabilistic Program Sketches Milan Češka, Christian Hensel, Sebastian Junges, and Joost-Pieter Katoen	101
Synthesis of Railway Signaling Layout from Local Capacity Specifications Bjørnar Luteberget, Christian Johansen, and Martin Steffen	121

Pegasus: A Framework for Sound Continuous Invariant Generation.

Andrew Sogokon, Stefan Mitsch, Yong Kiam Tan, Katherine Cordwell,

and André Platzer

138

Concurrency

A Parametric Rely-Guarantee Reasoning Framework for Concurrent Reactive Systems	161
Yongwang Zhao, David Sanán, Fuyuan Zhang, and Yang Liu	
Verifying Correctness of Persistent Concurrent Data Structures John Derrick, Simon Doherty, Brijesh Dongol, Gerhard Schellhorn, and Heike Wehrheim	179
Compositional Verification of Concurrent Systems by Combining Bisimulations	196
Model Checking Circus	
Towards a Model-Checker for <i>Circus</i>	217
Circus2CSP: A Tool for Model-Checking Circus Using FDR Artur Oliveira Gomes and Andrew Butterfield	235
Model Checking	
How Hard Is Finding Shortest Counter-Example Lassos in Model Checking?	245
From LTL to Unambiguous Büchi Automata via Disambiguation	262
of Alternating Automata	262
Generic Partition Refinement and Weighted Tree Automata	280
Equilibria-Based Probabilistic Model Checking for Concurrent	298
Stochastic Games	298
Analysis Techniques	
Abstract Execution	319
Static Analysis for Detecting High-Level Races in RTOS Kernels Abhishek Singh, Rekha Pai, Deepak D'Souza, and Meenakshi D'Souza	337

Contents	xix
Parallel Composition and Modular Verification of Computer Controlled Systems in Differential Dynamic Logic	354
An Axiomatic Approach to Liveness for Differential Equations	371
Local Consistency Check in Synchronous Dataflow Models	389
Gray-Box Monitoring of Hyperproperties	406
Quantitative Verification of Numerical Stability for Kalman Filters	425
Concolic Testing Heap-Manipulating Programs Long H. Pham, Quang Loc Le, Quoc-Sang Phan, and Jun Sun	442
Specification Languages	
Formal Semantics Extraction from Natural Language Specifications for ARM	465
GOSPEL—Providing OCaml with a Formal Specification Language Arthur Charguéraud, Jean-Christophe Filliâtre, Cláudio Lourenço, and Mário Pereira	484
Unification in Matching Logic	502
Embedding High-Level Formal Specifications into Applications	519
Reasoning Techniques	
Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security on Weak Memory Models Graeme Smith, Nicholas Coughlin, and Toby Murray	539
Reasoning Formally About Database Queries and Updates	556

Abstraction and Subsumption in Modular Verification of C Programs

Lennart Beringer and Andrew W. Appel

573

Modelling Languages

for the Blockchain	593
Theodoros Kasampalis, Dwight Guth, Brandon Moore, Traian Florin Șerbănuță, Yi Zhang, Daniele Filaretti, Virgil Șerbănuță, Ralph Johnson, and Grigore Roșu	
APML: An Architecture Proof Modeling Language Diego Marmsoler and Genc Blakqori	611
Learning-Based Techniques and Applications	
Learning Deterministic Variable Automata over Infinite Alphabets	633
L*-Based Learning of Markov Decision Processes	651
Star-Based Reachability Analysis of Deep Neural Networks Hoang-Dung Tran, Diago Manzanas Lopez, Patrick Musau, Xiaodong Yang, Luan Viet Nguyen, Weiming Xiang, and Taylor T. Johnson	670
Refactoring and Reprogramming	
SOA and the Button Problem	689
Controlling Large Boolean Networks with Temporary and Permanent Perturbations	707
I-Day Presentations	
Formal Methods Applicability on Space Applications Specification and Implementation Using MORA-TSP	727
Industrial Application of Event-B to a Wayside Train Monitoring System: Formal Conceptual Data Analysis	738
Property-Driven Software Analysis (Extended Abstract)	746

	Contents	xxi
Practical Application of SPARK to OpenUxAS		751
Adopting Formal Methods in an Industrial Setting: The Railways C Maurice H. ter Beek, Arne Borälv, Alessandro Fantechi, Alessio F Stefania Gnesi, Christer Löfving, and Franco Mazzanti		762
Author Index		773