Abstract
In manipulable multi-agent argumentation, each agent may transmit deceptive information to others for tactical motives. We contemplate epistemic states and their roles in deception/honesty detection and (mis)trust-building. We propose the use of intra-agent preferences for handling deception/honesty detection and inter-agent preferences for determining which agent(s) to believe in more. We illustrate how deception/honesty in an argumentation of an agent, if detected, may alter the agent’s perceived trustworthiness, and how that may affect agents’ judgement as to which arguments they should accept. A detailed comparison to an earlier study on deception detection highlights wider applicability of our approach.
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Notes
- 1.
“\(\textsf {and}\)” instead of “and” is used when the context in which the word appears strongly indicates classic-logic truth-value comparisons. Similarly for \(\textsf {or}\) (disjunction) and \(\textsf {not}\) (negation).
- 2.
\(e_1\) cannot be certain \(a_5\) is factual to \(e_2\), since, firstly, there may or may not be Detective in a game, and, secondly, it could be Civilian who is bluffing to be Detective.
- 3.
Recall \(e_2\) knows \(e_1\) knows \(a_1\); as such, \(a_1\) appears in \(e_2\)’s model of \(e_1\)’s preference-adjusted local agent argumentation. Recall also it is a common knowledge that Killer does not know whether there be Detective; as such, from \(e_2\)’s perspective, neither \(a_4\) nor \(a_5\) is known by \(e_1\) to be factual to \(e_2\).
- 4.
Since every public argumentation is known to every agent, the converse is not possible.
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Arisaka, R., Hagiwara, M., Ito, T. (2019). Deception/Honesty Detection and (Mis)trust Building in Manipulable Multi-Agent Argumentation: An Insight. In: Baldoni, M., Dastani, M., Liao, B., Sakurai, Y., Zalila Wenkstern, R. (eds) PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11873. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_28
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