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An Investigation of Using Time and Ambient Conditions to Sense the Unexpected Removal of RFID Tag

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Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1113))

Abstract

The unexpected RFID tag removal is a severe problem to RFID-based information system. It can result in erroneous asset identification, mismatched item-level information, and such security threats as impersonation or identity theft. However, only very few scholars and practitioners have ever carefully investigated this problem and managed to solve it. On the other hand, many firms are going to tag their overall assets, products, etc. with RFID tags, but they are currently either clueless about the problem or limited in the choices for solving it. This study presents a solution prototype of integrating time and ambient conditions to sense the RFID tag unexpected removal in an autonomous and secured way.

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Correspondence to Yuju Tu .

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Tu, Y. (2019). An Investigation of Using Time and Ambient Conditions to Sense the Unexpected Removal of RFID Tag. In: Doss, R., Piramuthu, S., Zhou, W. (eds) Future Network Systems and Security. FNSS 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1113. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34353-8_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34353-8_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-34352-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-34353-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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