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Incentive Mechanism for Bitcoin Mining Pool Based on Stackelberg Game

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Science of Cyber Security (SciSec 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11933))

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Abstract

Bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency all over the world. Existing mining pool systems do not consider the cost of miners. In this paper, we propose a novel pool mining mechanism based on Stackelberg game to incentivize the rational miners in Bitcoin mining pool. Through both theoretical analysis and simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanism achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, and profitability. Moreover, we show that the Stackelberg game has a unique Equilibrium.

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Acknowledgements

This work has been supported in part by the NSFC (No. 61872193, 61872191, 61872197).

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Correspondence to Jia Xu .

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Xue, G., Xu, J., Wu, H., Lu, W., Xu, L. (2019). Incentive Mechanism for Bitcoin Mining Pool Based on Stackelberg Game. In: Liu, F., Xu, J., Xu, S., Yung, M. (eds) Science of Cyber Security. SciSec 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11933. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34637-9_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34637-9_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-34636-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-34637-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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