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Prediction Based Reverse Auction Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing System

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Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 11949))

Abstract

With the rapid development of the Internet, Mobile Crowdsensing System (MCS) is widely used in various fields. Because of the insufficient number of users’ participation and the insufficient amount of uploaded sensing data, the research of incentive mechanism is particularly important in MCS. Reverse auction mechanism is one of the efficient incentive mechanism in MCS. The platform is responsible for publishing a group of tasks which are bidded by the workers, and only the winning workers are authorized to complete the tasks. One of the critical factors for successful bidding is the distance between the tasks and the workers. However, most workers in MCS always keep moving. So this paper proposes a prediction based reverse auction incentive mechanism—RMMP. We use the Semi-Markov model to predict the position of workers at the next moment. According to the predicated positions, our reverse auction incentive mechanism selects the winner workers with the minimum movement distance and bidding price. Experiment results on real dataset show that our RMMP mechanism has remarkable performance compared with the existing mechanisms.

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Correspondence to Jinghua Zhu .

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Wang, Z., Zhu, J., Li, D. (2019). Prediction Based Reverse Auction Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing System. In: Li, Y., Cardei, M., Huang, Y. (eds) Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. COCOA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11949. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36412-0_44

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36412-0_44

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-36411-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-36412-0

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