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TL;DR Hazard: A Comprehensive Study of Levelsquatting Scams

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a large-scale analysis about an emerging new type of domain-name fraud, which we call levelsquatting. Unlike existing frauds that impersonate well-known brand names (like google.com) by using similar second-level domain names, adversaries here embed brand name in the subdomain section, deceiving users especially mobile users who do not pay attention to the entire domain names.

First, we develop a detection system, LDS, based on passive DNS data and webpage content. Using LDS, we successfully detect 817,681 levelsquatting domains. Second, we perform detailed characterization on levelsquatting scams. Existing blacklists are less effective against levelsquatting domains, with only around 4% of domains reported by VirusTotal and PhishTank respectively. In particular, we find a number of levelsquatting domains impersonate well-known search engines. So far, Baidu security team has acknowledged our findings and removed these domains from its search result. Finally, we analyze how levelsquatting domain names are displayed in different browsers. We find 2 mobile browsers (Firefox and UC) and 1 desktop browser (Internet Explorer) that can confuse users when showing levelsquatting domain names in the address bar.

In summary, our study sheds light to the emerging levelsquatting fraud and we believe new approaches are needed to mitigate this type of fraud.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://www.phishtank.com/.

  2. 2.

    https://www.virustotal.com/.

  3. 3.

    https://www.godaddy.com/.

  4. 4.

    We use the public suffix list provided by https://publicsuffix.org/ to match eTLD.

  5. 5.

    https://www.dnsdb.info/.

  6. 6.

    https://www.passivedns.cn/.

  7. 7.

    http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip.

  8. 8.

    https://www.alexa.com/topsites/category.

  9. 9.

    We are not able to obtain WHOIS records for all e2LDs within \(Dom_{Sus}\) because they have become expired when we queried.

  10. 10.

    https://github.com/TeamHG-Memex/page-compare.

  11. 11.

    https://www.seleniumhq.org/.

  12. 12.

    https://scikit-image.org/.

  13. 13.

    The “query” mode retrieves the prior scanning result of a URL that has been submitted to VirusTotal by another user.

  14. 14.

    https://github.com/shuque/pydig.

  15. 15.

    https://github.com/zmap/zmap.

  16. 16.

    http://www.ucweb.com/.

  17. 17.

    https://liulanqi.baidu.com/.

  18. 18.

    http://se.360.cn/.

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Acknowledgments

We thank anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. This work is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (U1836213, U1636204) and the BNRist Network and Software Security Research Program (Grant No. BNR2019TD01004).

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Correspondence to Haixin Duan .

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© 2019 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Du, K. et al. (2019). TL;DR Hazard: A Comprehensive Study of Levelsquatting Scams. In: Chen, S., Choo, KK., Fu, X., Lou, W., Mohaisen, A. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2019. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 305. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_1

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