Abstract
The Apollo voting protocol improves on the integrity properties of Helios by enabling voters to communicate to the public the failure of the cast-as-intended check, in the event that the voting terminal changes the vote on receiving the credential. It also enables the voter to detect a dishonest registrar and to prove misbehaviour. It provides an explicit description of the role of one or more computational voting assistants which help the voter perform the checks without obtaining information on the vote. Unfortunately, neither Helios nor Apollo provides ballot secrecy, because the voting terminal knows the vote. We present PrivApollo, a protocol that improves Apollo by providing ballot secrecy from the voting terminal.
H. Wu and P. L. Vora—This material is based upon work supported in part by the Maryland Procurement Office under contract H98230-14-C-0127 and NSF Award CNS 1421373.
F. Zagórski—Author was partially supported by Polish National Science Centre contract number DEC-2013/09/D/ST6/03927 and by Wroclaw University of Science and Technology [0401/0052/18].
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Notes
- 1.
Apollo relaxes this requirement by using irrepudiable credentials (such as credentials under scratch-off as in Remotegrity) to thwart a registrar who attempts to use the voter’s credentials to cast a vote. PrivApollo does not make any changes to Apollo ’s registrar and credentials.
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Wu, H., Vora, P.L., Zagórski, F. (2020). PrivApollo – Secret Ballot E2E-V Internet Voting. In: Bracciali, A., Clark, J., Pintore, F., Rønne, P., Sala, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11599. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43725-1_21
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