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Tobias Harks · Max Klimm (Eds.)

# Algorithmic Game Theory

13th International Symposium, SAGT 2020  
Augsburg, Germany, September 16–18, 2020  
Proceedings

*Editors*

Tobias Harks  
Institute of Mathematics  
Augsburg University  
Augsburg, Germany

Max Klimm  
Institute of Mathematics  
Technical University Berlin  
Berlin, Germany

ISSN 0302-9743                      ISSN 1611-3349 (electronic)  
Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
ISBN 978-3-030-57979-1              ISBN 978-3-030-57980-7 (eBook)  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7>

LNCS Sublibrary: SL3 – Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI

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# Preface

This volume contains the papers and extended abstracts presented at the 13th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2020) held virtually during September 16–18, 2020.

The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from Computer Science, Economics, Mathematics, Operations Research, Psychology, Physics, and Biology to present and discuss original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory.

The Program Committee (PC), consisting of 24 top researchers from the field, reviewed 53 submissions and decided to accept 24 papers. Each paper had three reviews, with additional reviews solicited as needed. We are very grateful to the PC for their insightful reviews and discussions. The review process was conducted entirely electronically via Easy Chair – we gratefully acknowledge this support.

The works accepted for publication in this volume cover most of the major aspects of Algorithmic Game Theory, including auction theory, mechanism design, two-sided markets, computational aspects of games, congestion games, dynamic equilibrium flows, resource allocation problems, and computational social choice.

To accommodate the publishing traditions of different fields, authors of accepted papers could ask that only a one-page abstract of the paper appeared in the proceedings. Among the 24 accepted papers, the authors of 3 papers selected this option.

Furthermore, due to the general support by Springer, we were able to provide a Best Paper Award. The PC decided to give the award to the paper “On the Approximability of the Stable Matching Problem with Ties of Constant Size up to the Integrality Gap” authored by Jochen Könemann, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, and Natig Tofigzade.

The program included three invited talks by leading researchers in the field: Dirk Bergemann (Yale University, USA), Paul Dütting (London School of Economics, UK), Ruta Mehta (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA).

We would like to thank all the authors for their interest in submitting their work to SAGT 2020, as well as the PC members and the external reviewers for their great work in evaluating the submissions. We also want to thank EATCS, Springer, Facebook, and the COST Action GAMENET (CA16228) for their generous financial support. We are grateful to Monika Deininger at Augsburg University for her help with the conference website and organization.

Finally, we would also like to thank Anna Kramer at Springer for helping with the proceedings, and the EasyChair conference management system.

July 2020

Tobias Harks  
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