

Algorithms for Data and Computation Privacy

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*Dedicated with love and respect
to my parents
Yuhai Liu (God rest his soul) and Shuxiang
Wang,
to my wife
Chenyang Li,
to my twin sons
Max Boyang and Louis Boyang,
to whom I owe
all that I am and all that I have
accomplished.*

– Alex X. Liu

*To my dearest wife Jian Zhou, my son Zixuan
Li, and my parents Jixiang Li and Yuqiong Li.
Thanks for your support and understanding.*

–Rui Li

Contents

Part I Privacy Preserving Queries

1	Range Queries over Encrypted Data	3
1.1	Introduction.....	3
1.1.1	Background and Motivation.....	3
1.1.2	Threat Model.....	5
1.1.3	Security Model.....	5
1.1.4	Summary and Limitation of Prior Art	6
1.1.5	Proposed Approach.....	7
1.1.6	Technical Challenges and Solutions	7
1.1.7	Key Contributions	8
1.2	Related Work	8
1.3	PBtree Construction	8
1.3.1	Prefix Encoding.....	9
1.3.2	Tree Construction.....	9
1.3.3	Node Randomization Using Bloom Filters.....	12
1.3.4	Trapdoor Computation	13
1.3.5	Query Processing	14
1.3.6	False Positive Analysis	14
1.4	PBtree Search Optimization	15
1.4.1	Traversal Width Optimization.....	16
1.4.2	Traversal Depth Optimization.....	19
1.5	PBtree Update	21
1.5.1	PBtree Insertion Algorithm	21
1.5.2	PBtree Modification Algorithm	22
1.5.3	PBtree Deletion Algorithm.....	23
1.6	Security Analysis.....	24
1.6.1	Security Model.....	24
1.6.2	Security Proof.....	25
1.7	Experimental Evaluation	27
1.7.1	Experimental Methodology	27

1.7.2	Evaluation of PBtree Construction	29
1.7.3	Query Evaluation Performance	30
1.7.4	Experimental Results on Updating	32
1.8	Conclusions.....	34
	References.....	34
2	Fast and Scalable Range and Keyword Query Processing Over Encrypted Data with Provable Adaptive Security	37
2.1	Introduction.....	37
2.1.1	Motivation and Problem Statement	37
2.1.2	Threat Model.....	38
2.1.3	Security Model.....	38
2.1.4	Limitation of Prior Art	39
2.1.5	Proposed Approach.....	40
2.1.6	Novelty and Advantages Over Prior Art.....	41
2.2	Related Work	41
2.3	Basic IBtree Algorithms	42
2.3.1	Index Element Encoding	42
2.3.2	IBF Construction	43
2.3.3	IBtree Construction.....	44
2.3.4	Trapdoor Computation	45
2.3.5	Query Processing	47
2.4	Optimized IBtree Algorithms.....	48
2.4.1	IBtree Traversal Width Minimization.....	48
2.4.2	IBtree Traversal Depth Minimization.....	51
2.4.3	IBtree Compression	53
2.5	Security Analysis.....	56
2.6	Experimental Evaluation	58
2.6.1	Experimental Methodology	58
2.6.2	Index Size	60
2.6.3	Index Construction Time	61
2.6.4	Query Processing Time.....	62
2.6.5	Compared with PBtree and KRB	63
2.7	Conclusions.....	65
	References.....	65
3	Nearest Neighbor Queries over Encrypted Data	69
3.1	Introduction.....	69
3.2	Insecurity of ASPE.....	70
3.2.1	ASPE I and II	71
3.2.2	Attack Method	71
3.2.3	Experimental Results	73
3.3	Hardness Analysis.....	75
3.4	Conclusions.....	76
	References.....	77

4	K-Nearest Neighbor Queries Over Encrypted Data	79
4.1	Introduction	79
4.1.1	Motivations	79
4.1.2	Problem Formulation	80
4.1.3	Service Model and Design Goals	80
4.1.4	Comparison with Prior Arts	82
4.1.5	Technical Challenges and Proposed Solutions	83
4.1.6	SecEQP Scheme Overview	84
4.1.7	Main Contributions	84
4.2	Space Encoding	85
4.2.1	Projection Function Introduction	85
4.2.2	Space Encoding via a Single Primitive Projection Function	86
4.2.3	Projection Function Composition Introduction	87
4.2.4	Space Encoding via Projection Function Composition	88
4.3	k NN Protocol for Plaintext Domain	90
4.3.1	k NN Protocol Design	90
4.3.2	Analysis of k NN Protocol Parameters	92
4.4	Transforming k NN to Secure k NN	95
4.4.1	Prefix-Free Encoding	95
4.4.2	Operation Transformation	96
4.4.3	Indistinguishable Bloom Filter Tree Based Secure Index	96
4.4.4	Sk NN Protocol (SecEQP) Design	98
4.4.5	Security Analysis	99
4.5	Performance Evaluation	101
4.5.1	Parameters Settings	101
4.5.2	Datasets, Metrics, and Implementation	101
4.5.3	Experiment Results	102
4.5.4	Improve Result Accuracy	104
4.6	Related Work	107
4.7	Conclusions	107
	References	107
5	Top-k Queries for Two-Tiered Sensor Networks	109
5.1	Introduction	109
5.1.1	Motivation	109
5.1.2	Problem Statement	110
5.1.3	Adversary and Security Model	111
5.1.4	Limitations of Prior Art	111
5.1.5	Technical Challenges and Proposed Approach	112
5.1.6	Key Contributions	113
5.2	Related Work	113
5.3	System Model and Assumptions	114
5.4	Sensor Data Pre-Processing: Mapping and Partitioning	115
5.4.1	Approximating Uniform Distribution	115

5.4.2	Data Partitioning for Integrity Verification	117
5.4.3	Embedding Intervals with Data	118
5.4.4	Index Selection	119
5.5	Privacy Preserving Index Generation	119
5.5.1	Prefix Encoding and Bloom Filter Indexing.....	119
5.5.2	Randomizing Bloom Filter Indexes.....	120
5.6	Trapdoor Computation and Query Processing	122
5.6.1	Top- k to Top-Range Query.....	122
5.6.2	Trapdoor Computation	124
5.6.3	Query Execution	124
5.6.4	Integrity Verification for Query Results	125
5.6.5	False Positive Rate Analysis	125
5.7	Security Analysis.....	126
5.8	Performance Evaluation.....	129
5.8.1	Experimental Setup.....	129
5.8.2	Summary for Experimental Results.....	130
5.8.3	Comparison with Prior Art	131
5.9	Conclusions.....	133
	References.....	133

Part II Privacy Preserving Computation

6 Collaborative Enforcement of Firewall Policies in Virtual

	Private Networks	139
6.1	Introduction.....	139
6.1.1	Background and Motivation.....	139
6.1.2	Technical Challenges	140
6.1.3	Limitations of Prior Art	141
6.1.4	Our Solution	141
6.1.5	Key Contributions	142
6.2	Threat Model	142
6.3	Background	142
6.4	Oblivious Comparison	143
6.5	Bootstrapping Protocol.....	146
6.5.1	FDD Construction	146
6.5.2	Range Conversion	148
6.5.3	Prefix Numericalization	148
6.5.4	Applying XOR by MSU	149
6.5.5	Applying XOR and HMAC by IBM.....	149
6.6	Filtering Protocol.....	150
6.6.1	Address Translation	151
6.6.2	Prefix Membership Verification.....	151
6.6.3	Packet Preprocessing by IBM.....	152
6.6.4	Packet Preprocessing by The Third Party	153
6.6.5	Packet Processing by MSU	153

6.7	VGuard for Deep Packet Inspection	154
6.7.1	The Bootstrapping Protocol	154
6.7.2	The Filtering Protocol	155
6.8	Discussion	157
6.8.1	Firewall Updates	157
6.8.2	Decision Caching	157
6.8.3	Decision Obfuscation vs. Decision Encryption	158
6.8.4	Special Treatment of IP Addresses	158
6.8.5	Securing Keys of MSU	159
6.8.6	Stateful Firewalls	160
6.8.7	Statistical Analysis Attack and Countermeasures	161
6.8.8	Hash Collision	161
6.9	Related Work	162
6.9.1	Secure Function Evaluation	162
6.9.2	CDCF Framework	163
6.9.3	Secure Queries	164
6.10	Experimental Results	165
6.10.1	Efficiency on Real-Life Firewall Policies	165
6.10.2	Efficiency on Synthetic Firewall Policies	167
6.11	Concluding Remarks	169
	References	169
7	Privacy Preserving Quantification of Cross-Domain Network	
	Reachability	171
7.1	Introduction	171
7.1.1	Background and Motivation	171
7.1.2	Limitation of Prior Art	172
7.1.3	Cross-Domain Quantification of Reachability	173
7.1.4	Technical Challenges	174
7.1.5	Our Approach	175
7.1.6	Summary of Experimental Results	176
7.1.7	Key Contributions	176
7.2	Related Work	176
7.2.1	Network Reachability	176
7.2.2	Privacy Preserving Set Operation	178
7.2.3	Privacy Preserving Collaborative Firewall Enforcement in VPN	178
7.3	Problem Statement and Threat Model	179
7.3.1	Access Control Lists (ACLs)	179
7.3.2	Problem Statement	179
7.3.3	Threat Model	180
7.4	Privacy-Preserving Quantification of Network Reachability	181
7.4.1	Privacy-Preserving Range Intersection	181
7.4.2	ACL Preprocessing	183
7.4.3	ACL Encoding and Encryption	185

7.4.4	ACL Comparison	187
7.5	Incremental Updates of ACLs	189
7.5.1	Addition of Rules with Accept Decision	190
7.5.2	Addition of Rules with Discard Decision	190
7.5.3	Addition of New Routers	191
7.6	Stateful Firewalls	191
7.7	Security and Complexity Analysis	192
7.7.1	Security Analysis	192
7.7.2	Complexity Analysis	193
7.8	Protocol Optimization	194
7.9	Experimental Results	194
7.9.1	Efficiency on Real ACLs	195
7.9.2	Efficiency on Synthetic ACLs	196
7.9.3	Efficiency of Incremental Updates of ACLs	198
7.10	Conclusions	199
	References	200
8	Cross-Domain Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Firewall Optimization	203
8.1	Introduction	203
8.1.1	Background and Motivation	203
8.1.2	Limitation of Prior Work	204
8.1.3	Cross-Domain Inter-Firewall Optimization	204
8.1.4	Technical Challenges and Our Approach	205
8.1.5	Key Contributions	206
8.2	Related Work	207
8.2.1	Firewall Redundancy Removal	207
8.2.2	Collaborative Firewall Enforcement in VPN	207
8.3	System and Threat Models	207
8.3.1	System Model	207
8.3.2	Threat Model	208
8.4	Privacy-Preserving Inter-Firewall Redundancy Removal	209
8.4.1	Privacy-Preserving Range Comparison	209
8.4.2	Processing Firewall FW_1	210
8.4.3	Processing Firewall FW_2	213
8.4.4	Single-Rule Coverage Redundancy Detection	215
8.4.5	Multi-Rule Coverage Redundancy Detection	216
8.4.6	Identification and Removal of Redundant Rules	219
8.5	Firewall Update After Optimization	220
8.6	Security and Complexity Analysis	221
8.6.1	Security Analysis	221
8.6.2	Complexity Analysis	222
8.7	Experimental Results	223
8.7.1	Evaluation Setup	223
8.7.2	Methodology	223

8.7.3	Effectiveness and Efficiency on Real Policies	224
8.7.4	Efficiency on Synthetic Policies	226
8.8	Conclusions and Future Work	228
	References	229
9	Privacy Preserving String Matching for Cloud Computing	231
9.1	Introduction	231
9.1.1	Motivation	231
9.1.2	Problem Statement	232
9.1.3	Adversary and Security Model	232
9.1.4	Limitation of Prior Art	233
9.1.5	Proposed Approach	233
9.1.6	Technical Challenges and Solutions	234
9.1.7	Key Contributions	234
9.2	Related Work	235
9.3	Pattern Aware Secure Search Tree	235
9.3.1	String Pattern Matching	236
9.3.2	PASStree Structure	236
9.3.3	Preserving Privacy of Bloom Filters	238
9.3.4	Query Trapdoor Generation and Processing	239
9.4	PASStree+	240
9.4.1	Challenge in Search Optimization	240
9.4.2	Optimizing PASStree	240
9.5	Ranking Search Results	242
9.5.1	Recording Matching Positions	242
9.5.2	Ranking Algorithm	243
9.6	Security Analysis	243
9.6.1	Security Model	243
9.6.2	Security Proof	244
9.7	Performance Evaluation	246
9.7.1	Experimental Methodology	246
9.7.2	PASStree Construction and Size	248
9.7.3	Query Processing Speed and Accuracy	249
9.7.4	Ranking Precision	249
9.8	Conclusion and Future Work	250
	References	250
10	Privacy Preserving Information Hub Identification in Social Networks	253
10.1	Introduction	253
10.1.1	Background and Motivation	253
10.1.2	Limitations of Prior Art	254
10.1.3	Proposed Solution	254
10.1.4	Results and Findings	256
10.1.5	Key Contributions	256
10.2	Related Work	257

10.3	Proposed Solution	258
10.3.1	Eigenvector Centrality	258
10.3.2	Motivation for Principal Component Centrality	259
10.3.3	Definition of PCC	259
10.3.4	Generalized PCC	260
10.3.5	Selection of Number of Eigenvectors	263
10.3.6	Decentralized Eigendecomposition Algorithm	263
10.4	Performance Evaluation	265
10.4.1	Data Sets	265
10.4.2	Selection of PCC Parameter	268
10.4.3	Comparison with Ground Truth	268
10.5	Conclusions	274
	References	274

Part III Differential Privacy

11	Publishing Social Network Data with Privacy Guarantees	279
11.1	Introduction	279
11.1.1	Background and Motivation	279
11.1.2	Problem Statement	280
11.1.3	Limitations of Prior Art	280
11.1.4	Proposed Approach	281
11.1.5	Technical Challenges	281
11.1.6	Key Contributions	282
11.2	Related Work	283
11.2.1	Differential Privacy	283
11.2.2	Differential Privacy in Data Publishing	283
11.3	Random Matrix Approach	284
11.3.1	Theoretical Guarantee on Differential Privacy	286
11.3.2	Theoretical Guarantee on Eigenvector Approximation	289
11.4	Experimental Results	292
11.4.1	Dataset	293
11.4.2	Node Clustering	293
11.4.3	Node Ranking	300
11.5	Utility Comparison	303
11.6	Conclusions	308
	References	308
12	Predictable Privacy-Preserving Mobile Crowd Sensing	313
12.1	Introduction	313
12.2	Related Work	314
12.3	Privacy of MCS	315
12.3.1	Threat Model	315
12.3.2	Data Reconstruction Attack	316
12.4	Differentially Private Mechanisms for Privacy-Preserving MCS	316
12.4.1	Models and Definitions	316

12.4.2	The Basic Laplacian Mechanism	318
12.4.3	The Salus Algorithm	320
12.5	Role User: The Privacy Quantification	322
12.5.1	Data Reconstruction Error: A Quantitative Analysis	322
12.5.2	Data Reconstruction Error: A Lower Bound	325
12.6	Role Application Publisher: The Utility Prediction	328
12.6.1	Average (AVG)	328
12.6.2	Histogram (HIST)	331
12.6.3	Classifiers (CLS)	333
12.7	The P^3 Framework for Predictable Privacy-Preserving MCS	337
12.8	Performance Evaluation.....	338
12.8.1	Privacy Protection	339
12.8.2	System Overhead	339
12.8.3	Case Studies	340
12.9	Conclusions.....	344
	References.....	344
13	Differentially Private and Budget Limited Bandit Learning over Matroids	347
13.1	Introduction.....	347
13.1.1	Limitations of Prior Art	349
13.1.2	Proposed Approach.....	349
13.1.3	Advantages over Prior Art.....	350
13.2	Related Work	351
13.2.1	MAB Algorithms Without Budgets.....	351
13.2.2	MAB Algorithms with Budgets.....	352
13.2.3	Privacy-Aware Online Learning	353
13.3	Problem Statement	353
13.3.1	Matroids.....	354
13.3.2	DP-Aware BMAB Over Matroids	354
13.3.3	An Example in Crowdsourcing	355
13.4	Bounding the Optimal Policy	356
13.5	Algorithm Design	357
13.5.1	Ensuring Differential Privacy	358
13.5.2	The OPBM Algorithm.....	358
13.6	Regret Analysis.....	364
13.7	Performance Evaluation.....	367
13.7.1	Experimental Setup.....	367
13.7.2	Metrics	368
13.7.3	Regret Performance	368
13.7.4	Time Efficiency	370
13.8	Conclusion.....	371
	References.....	381

Part IV Breaking Privacy

14 Breaching Privacy in Encrypted Instant Messaging Networks.....	385
14.1 Introduction.....	385
14.1.1 Chapter Organization.....	387
14.2 Related Work.....	387
14.2.1 Mix Network De-anonymization.....	387
14.2.2 Social Network De-anonymization.....	388
14.3 Problem Description and Attack Scenarios.....	388
14.3.1 IM Service Architecture.....	388
14.3.2 Attack Scenarios.....	390
14.4 COLD: COmmunication Link De-anonymization.....	390
14.4.1 Architecture.....	391
14.4.2 Details.....	392
14.4.3 Example.....	394
14.5 Experimental Results.....	395
14.5.1 Data Set.....	396
14.5.2 Evaluation Metrics.....	398
14.5.3 Results.....	398
14.5.4 Discussions.....	400
14.6 Evasion and Countermeasures.....	402
14.7 Conclusions.....	403
References.....	403

Acronyms

ACL	Access control list
AM	Anonymization module
ASPE	Asymmetric scalar-product-preserving encryption
BDD	Binary decision diagram
BMAB	Budget-limited multi-armed bandit
CDCF	Cross-domain cooperative firewall
COLD	COmmunication Link De-anonymization
CTL	Computation tree logic
DP	Differential privacy
EVC	Eigenvector centrality
FDD	Firewall decision diagram
GSR	Galvanic skin response
IBF	Indistinguishable Bloom filter
IBtree	Indistinguishable binary tree
ICA	Independent component analysis
IDD	Interval decision diagram
IM	Instant messaging
IND-CKA	Indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack
IND-CPA	Indistinguishability against chosen plain-text attack
IND-OCPA	Indistinguishable under ordered chosen plain-text attack
IPSeS	Intrusion prevention systems
ISP	Internet service provider
kNN	k-nearest neighbor
LSH	Locality sensitive hashing
MAB	Multi-armed bandit
MCS	Mobile crowd sensing
MSE	Average mean squared error
MSU	Michigan State University
NAT	Network address translation
OAR	Overall approximation ratio
OSN	Online social network

PASStree	Pattern aware secure search tree
PBtree	Privacy Bloom filter tree
PCA	Principal component analysis
PCC	Principal component centrality
PPT	Probabilistic polynomial time
QoS	Quality of service
SANE	Secure architecture for the networked enterprise
SecEQP	Secure and efficient query processing
SNN	Secure nearest neighbor
SP	Sub-string prefix
SRA	Secure RPC authentication
SSE	Searchable symmetric encryption
TF-IDF	Term-frequency inverse-document-frequency
VPN	Virtual private network