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Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption from Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions

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Book cover Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12244))

Abstract

In this work we study the leakage resilience of authenticated encryption schemes. We show that, if one settles for non-adaptive leakage, leakage-resilient authenticated encryption schemes can be built from leakage-resilient pseudorandom functions.

Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT 2019) introduce the \({ \textsc {FGHF}}^{\prime }\) construction which allows to build leakage-resilient authenticated encryption schemes from functions which, under leakage, retain both pseudorandomness and unpredictability. We revisit their construction and show the following. First, pseudorandomness and unpredictability do not imply one another in the leakage setting. Unfortunately, this entails that any instantiation of the \({ \textsc {FGHF}}^{\prime }\) construction indeed seems to require a function that is proven both pseudorandom and unpredictable under leakage. Second, however, we show that the unpredictability requirement is an artefact that stems from the underlying composition theorem of the \({ \textsc {N2}}\) construction given by Barwell et al. (ASIACRYPT 2017). By recasting this composition theorem, we show that the unpredictability requirement is unnecessary for the \({ \textsc {FGHF}}^{\prime }\) construction. Thus, leakage-resilient AEAD schemes can be obtained by instantiating the \({ \textsc {FGHF}}^{\prime }\) construction with functions that are solely pseudorandom under leakage.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that the same does not work for pseudorandomness. Leakage of a single output bit allows to easily distinguish the function from a random function.

  2. 2.

    \(\mathcal {A}_{mac}\) does not submit a leakage function, as it simulates a challenge oracle for \(\mathcal {A}_{ae}\).

  3. 3.

    Note that \( \mathtt {Enc} ( K , N , C ) = \mathtt {Dec} ( K , N , C )\).

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Acknowledgements

We thank Jean Paul Degabriele and Christian Janson for helpful discussions. This work was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) – SFB 1119 – 236615297.

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  1. Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Juliane Krämer & Patrick Struck

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  1. Juliane Krämer
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Correspondence to Patrick Struck .

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  1. RD, Security Pattern SRL, Brescia, Brescia, Italy

    Guido Marco Bertoni

  2. AlaRI, Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland

    Francesco Regazzoni

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Krämer, J., Struck, P. (2021). Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption from Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions. In: Bertoni, G.M., Regazzoni, F. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12244. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68773-1_15

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