Abstract
We show how to enhance a classical ballot box to enable automatic tally, while keeping the voter experience as close as possible to the one she already knows. We describe the physical add-on, based on off-the-shelf infrared technology, as well as the cryptographic aspects, for which we rely on self-enforcing e-voting systems by Hao et al.
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Chabanne, H., Dottax, E., Dumont, D. (2021). Augmented Voting Reality. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Leneutre, J., Cuppens, N., Yaich, R. (eds) Risks and Security of Internet and Systems. CRiSIS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12528. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68887-5_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68887-5_18
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