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International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography

SAC 2020: Selected Areas in Cryptography pp 483–511Cite as

PRINCEv2

More Security for (Almost) No Overhead

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12804))

Abstract

In this work, we propose tweaks to the PRINCE block cipher that help us to increase its security without changing the number of rounds or round operations. We get substantially higher security for the same complexity. From an implementation perspective, PRINCEv2 comes at an extremely low overhead compared to PRINCE in all key categories, such as area, latency and energy. We expect, as it is already the case for PRINCE, that the new cipher PRINCEv2 will be deployed in various settings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    see https://www.emsec.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/research/research_startseite/prince-challenge/.

  2. 2.

    Area is saved by this optimization since slower cells with a lower drive strength can be selected for the parallel calculations. Those cells have a smaller area footprint.

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Acknowledgments

The work described in this paper has been partially supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA - 390781972 and through the project 271752544 and partially by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF, project iBlockchain – 16KIS0901K).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NXP Semiconductors, Leuven, Belgium

    Dušan Božilov & Ventzislav Nikov

  2. COSIC KU Leuven and imec, Leuven, Belgium

    Dušan Božilov

  3. Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria

    Maria Eichlseder

  4. Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Maria Eichlseder, Baptiste Lambin, Gregor Leander, Thorben Moos, Shahram Rasoolzadeh, Yosuke Todo & Friedrich Wiemer

  5. cryptosolutions, Essen, Germany

    Gregor Leander & Friedrich Wiemer

  6. NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, Tokyo, 180-8585, Japan

    Yosuke Todo

  7. NXP Semiconductors, Austin, USA

    Miroslav Knežević

Authors
  1. Dušan Božilov
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  2. Maria Eichlseder
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  3. Miroslav Knežević
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  4. Baptiste Lambin
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  5. Gregor Leander
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  6. Thorben Moos
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  7. Ventzislav Nikov
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  8. Shahram Rasoolzadeh
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  9. Yosuke Todo
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  10. Friedrich Wiemer
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Dušan Božilov , Maria Eichlseder , Miroslav Knežević , Baptiste Lambin , Gregor Leander , Thorben Moos , Ventzislav Nikov , Shahram Rasoolzadeh , Yosuke Todo or Friedrich Wiemer .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

    Orr Dunkelman

  2. University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

    Michael J. Jacobson, Jr.

  3. Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada

    Colin O'Flynn

Appendices

A Code

SageMath code to generate the round constants:

figure b

The output is:

figure c

The 0th constant is not used in PRINCE, so we skip it, too. The second last constant (line 6) is \(\alpha \) and thus we use the last one (line 7) as \(\beta \).

B Test Vectors

Plaintext

\(k_0\)

\(k_1\)

Ciphertext

0000000000000000

0000000000000000

0000000000000000

0125fc7359441690

ffffffffffffffff

0000000000000000

0000000000000000

832bd46f108e7857

0000000000000000

ffffffffffffffff

0000000000000000

ee873b2ec447944d

0000000000000000

0000000000000000

ffffffffffffffff

0ac6f9cd6e6f275d

0123456789abcdef

0123456789abcdef

fedcba9876543210

603cd95fa72a8704

Fig. 9.
figure 9

PRINCEv2 structure for encryption.

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Fig. 10.
figure 10

PRINCEv2 structure for encryption and decryption.

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Božilov, D. et al. (2021). PRINCEv2. In: Dunkelman, O., Jacobson, Jr., M.J., O'Flynn, C. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12804. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81652-0_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81652-0_19

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