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Joshua Guttman: Pioneering Strand Spaces

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Protocols, Strands, and Logic

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13066))

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Abstract

Joshua Guttman has made numerous contributions to formal methods and has played a leadership role in the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. He is predominantly known for his pioneering work in developing the strand space approach to protocol analysis and his efforts to bring researchers together to form a unified, cohesive, and effective community to design and evaluate cryptographic protocols. Another of Joshua’s contributions is the Interactive Mathematical Proof System (IMPS), developed jointly with colleagues at the MITRE Corporation, to provide computational support for mathematical reasoning.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, 94025, USA

    Sylvan Pinsky

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  1. Sylvan Pinsky
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Daniel Dougherty

  2. Th.M. Siebel Center for Computer Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA

    José Meseguer

  3. Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark

    Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim

  4. J83K, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA, USA

    Paul Rowe

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Pinsky, S. (2021). Joshua Guttman: Pioneering Strand Spaces. In: Dougherty, D., Meseguer, J., Mödersheim, S.A., Rowe, P. (eds) Protocols, Strands, and Logic. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13066. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_19

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-91631-2

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