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Efficient Boolean Search over Encrypted Data with Reduced Leakage

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Book cover Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2021 (ASIACRYPT 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13092))

Abstract

Encrypted multi-maps enable outsourcing the storage of a multi-map to an untrusted server while maintaining the ability to query privately. We focus on encrypted Boolean multi-maps that support arbitrary Boolean queries over the multi-map. Kamara and Moataz [Eurocrypt’17] presented the first encrypted multi-map, BIEX, that supports CNF queries with optimal communication, worst-case sublinear search time and non-trivial leakage.

We improve on previous work by presenting a new construction \(\mathsf {CNFFilter}\) for CNF queries with significantly less leakage than BIEX, while maintaining both optimal communication and worst-case sublinear search time. As a direct consequence our construction shows additional resistance to leakage-abuse attacks in comparison to prior works. For most CNF queries, \(\mathsf {CNFFilter}\) avoids leaking the result sets for any singleton queries for labels appearing in the CNF query. As an example, for the CNF query of the form \((\ell _1 \vee \ell _2) \wedge \ell _3\), our scheme does not leak the result sizes of queries to \(\ell _1, \ell _2\) or \(\ell _3\) individually. On the other hand, BIEX does leak some of this information. This is just an example of the reduced leakage obtained by \(\mathsf {CNFFilter}\). The core of \(\mathsf {CNFFilter}\) is a new filtering algorithm that performs set intersections with significantly less leakage compared to prior works.

We implement \(\mathsf {CNFFilter}\) and show that \(\mathsf {CNFFilter}\) achieves faster search times and similar communication overhead compared to BIEX at the cost of a small increase in server storage.

For the full version of this paper, please see [38].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    While BIEX considers Boolean searchable encryption, the basic construction is an encrypted Boolean multi-map.

  2. 2.

    In [28], the authors only present a construction for CNF queries. To derive a conjunction scheme, we consider the case where each disjunction clause is a single label.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Google LLC, Mountain View, USA

    Sarvar Patel, Giuseppe Persiano, Joon Young Seo & Kevin Yeo

  2. Università di Salerno, Fisciano, Italy

    Giuseppe Persiano

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  1. Sarvar Patel
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Correspondence to Sarvar Patel .

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  1. NTT Corporation, Tokyo, Japan

    Mehdi Tibouchi

  2. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Huaxiong Wang

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Patel, S., Persiano, G., Seo, J.Y., Yeo, K. (2021). Efficient Boolean Search over Encrypted Data with Reduced Leakage. In: Tibouchi, M., Wang, H. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2021. ASIACRYPT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13092. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92078-4_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92078-4_20

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