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International Conference on Network and System Security

NSS 2021: Network and System Security pp 369–382Cite as

Cryptanalysis of a Fully Anonymous Group Signature with Verifier-Local Revocation from ICICS 2018

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13041))

Abstract

For group signatures with verifier-local revocation (\(\textsf {GS}\hbox {-}\textsf {VLR}\)), selfless-anonymity (SA), which only ensures the anonymity of a signature against an adversary not possessing the signing secret-keys for members who were involved in the generation of the challenge signature, is strictly weaker than the de facto standard anonymity notion, full-anonymity, where the adversary is allowed to corrupt all members. At ICICS 2018, Hou et al. delivered a lattice-based fully anonymous \(\textsf {GS}\hbox {-}\textsf {VLR}\) scheme (as one core building block for their semi-generic construction of hierarchical \(\textsf {GS}\hbox {-}\textsf {VLR}\)) based on the first lattice-based \(\textsf {GS}\) scheme introduced by Gordon et al. at ASIACRYPT 2010. In this paper, we demonstrate that their scheme does not consider the anonymity for revoked members (no matter the misbehaving members or the honest ones who voluntarily leave), an implicit requirement for \(\textsf {GS}\hbox {-}\textsf {VLR}\) in a real-life application. Subsequently, we provide a modification of their construction to fix the mentioned weakness.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    At SCN 2018, Ishida et al. [12] proposed the basic framework of fully anonymous GS-VLR builded on ideas from creative work of Bellare et al. [3]. Concretely, a fully anonymous GS-VLR is obtained from a digital signature scheme, a key-private public-key encryption scheme, and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. However, no any specific cryptographic scheme was given by Ishida et al., and we do not know how to adopt algorithms over lattices to substitute all the operations efficiently and safely, and we cannot simply follow the steps of [12] to design a lattice-based FA-GS-VLR scheme. At ICICS 2018, Perera and Koshiba [19] claimed that the first lattice-based GS-VLR scheme achieving full security (i.e., FA and full-traceability) was successfully constructed by them. However, in fact, their construction does not satisfy FA and we explain this in detail in our another paper which was just accepted by ACNS 2021 workshops. Therefore, we have to tailor a new construction so that it can rely on some new and creatively techniques for lattice-based cryptography.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of NSS 2021 for their helpful comments and this research was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61802075), Guangxi key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security (Grant No. GCIS201907) and Natural Science Foundation of Henan Province (Grant No. 202300410508).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou, 450001, China

    Yanhua Zhang

  2. Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, 350108, China

    Ximeng Liu

  3. Xidian University, Xi’an, 710071, China

    Yupu Hu

  4. Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, 510006, China

    Huiwen Jia

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  1. Yanhua Zhang
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Correspondence to Yanhua Zhang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fudan University, Shanghai, China

    Min Yang

  2. James Cook University, Townsville, QLD, Australia

    Chao Chen

  3. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Yang Liu

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Zhang, Y., Liu, X., Hu, Y., Jia, H. (2021). Cryptanalysis of a Fully Anonymous Group Signature with Verifier-Local Revocation from ICICS 2018. In: Yang, M., Chen, C., Liu, Y. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13041. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92708-0_24

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